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I. INTRODUCTION 
Cloud computing is the newest big thing in remote computing 
technology. It allows a user to store his files and media on distant 
remote servers, the "cloud," in lieu of saving his materials to his local, 
personal hard drive. 1 The user can then access his data from any 
device with internet access. 2 The mobility of a user's personal files 
poses a problem for law enforcement agents who, armed with valid 
warrants, wish to search a suspect's computer. There is a high 
probability that a user has not saved his incriminating computer files 
on his personal computer's physical hard drive3 if he uses the cloud to 
store his data. 
* 
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See ANTHONY T. VELTE, TOBY J. VELTE & ROBERT ELSENPETER, CLOUD 
COMPUTING, A PRACTICAL APPROACH 3-22 (McGraw-Hill 2010) 
[hereinafter VELTE] (providing a general overview of cloud computing). 
Id. at 135 ("If you store your data on the cloud, you can get at it from 
any location that has Internet access .... Workers don't need to use the 
same computer to access data nor do they have to carry around physical 
storage devices."). 
See Dong Ngo, Digital storage basics, Part 1: Internal storage vs. 
memory, CNET (Nov. 7, 2012, 2:59 PM), [hereinafter Ngo] 
http://howto.cnet.com/8301-33088_39-57545421/digital-storage-basics-
part-1-internal-storage-vs-memory / (explaining that a hard drive is 
essentially a 'box containing a few magnetic disks,' which is connected 
to a computer or laptop via an interface); see also Dong Ngo, Digital 
storage basics, part 2: External drive vs. NAB server, CNET (Nov. 16, 
2012, 8:50 PM), [hereinafter Ngo II] http://howto.cnet.com/8301-
33088_39-5 7549884/ digital-storage-basics-part-2-external-drive-vs-nas-
server / (describing portable external servers, which connect to the 
computer and "become a storage extension of the host."). 
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. . Guidance from existing physical computer search doctrine is 
ln~uted, yet on~ thing is clear: a warrant for a physical computer hard 
d:1ve does .no.t mclud~ the right to search the cloud. In the simple yet 
highly realistic scenano described below, a law enforcement agent may 
not. know what his next steps are when he encounters a computer 
durmg a lawful search and suspects that the user may have utilized 
the cloud network. This Note argues that the answer is simple: the 
Fourth Amendment protects the cloud, thus law enforcement officers 
mu.st obtain ~ separate warrant to search a cloud network account. 
This pr?tection. is apparent when the Katz v. United States 
expectation of pnvacy test4 is applied. 
Recently, Justice Sotomayor stated in United States v. Jones: 
I for one doubt that people would accept without complaint the 
v:rarrantless disclosure to the Government of a list of every Web 
site they had visited in the law week, or month, or year .... I 
would not assume that all information voluntarily disclosed to 
some member of the public for a limited purpose is for that 
reason alone, disentitled to Fourth Amendment protection. 5 
. Justice Sotomayor's statement indicates that the expectation of 
pnv~~y must evolve with technology. This Note argues that the 
trad1t10nal warrant exceptions, such as the third party doctrine and 
consent s:arches, ha~e no pla.ce in cloud network searches in light of 
the evolvmg expectat10n of pnvacy in the technological era. 
When a police officer enters a house with a valid search warrant 
and sees a computer, it is not always clear what his next steps should 
be. Does the warrant include the computer? What exactly can he 
access on that computer? How does the officer determine what files 
he can look for and where he can look for them? To make matters 
w~rse, these are questions that an officer faces before he finds 
evidence. that the suspect 's computing has gone beyond the confines of 
the physical hard drive. 
Now, we add the cloud network to the confusion. Consider the 
following hypothetical: 
After an in-depth investigation, the police establish probable 
cause s~pporting a search warrant to search the suspect 's computer 
hard dnve for data related to an alleged crime. To obtain the 
war~ant, . the officers present affidavits to a neutral and detached 
~a~rn~rate. P~r the particularity requirement, the proposed warrant 
is h~mted to fi!~s save~ on the suspect's physical computer. The 
mag1str~te specifically limits the scope of the warrant to the physical 
hard dnve and grants it. 
4. 
5. 
389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
132 S.Ct. 945, 957 (2012). 
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Upon arnvmg at the suspect's residence, the police show the 
suspect the warrant and gain access to his computer. The police do 
not find any evidence on the computer's physical hard drive, but a 
computer specialist notes that there is evidence that the suspect has 
been using a cloud network account. 6 The police log into the 
suspect 's cloud account without his consent and find hundreds of 
incriminating files. He is arrested. 
After indictment, the defendant's attorney files a motion to 
suppress. The basis for the motion is that the seized data was beyond 
the scope of the warrant; therefore the search and seizure was 
unreasonable and violated the Fourth Amendment. The defendant 
argues the scope of the warrant limited the police to searching his 
physical hard drive, and that he did not grant the police authority to 
access his cloud storage account. Further, the police exceeded their 
authorization because the seized files were not stored on the 
defendant's computer, but on servers located hundreds of miles away. 
The defense attorney concludes the police should have obtained a 
separate warrant to search the cloud. 
This Note argues that the Fourth Amendment does not permit an 
officer to access files that were never saved on a suspect 's computer 
hard drive without a valid search warrant specific to cloud network 
storage account. The reasonable expectation of privacy test, 
established in Katz,7 protects the files and media that a user stores on 
the cloud. The use of the cloud network can be compared to search 
regulations of the United States Postal Service (USPS): although a 
sender entrusts his mail to the third-party USPS, the government is 
required to obtain a warrant before searching the packages.8 
Similarly, law enforcement must obtain a warrant before accessing 
documents or files saved on the cloud. Further, a cloud network user 
does not lose his expectation of privacy the way a person does when 
he places his trash on the curbside for pickup. The important 
distinction is that a person leaves his trash out knowing that 
6. This Note assumes that law enforcement wishes to search data saved 
only on the cloud. If there was a back-up copy saved on the computer, 
the warrant would cover the search. 
7. 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (noting that there is a twofold 
requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual subjective 
expectation of privacy and, second that the expectation be one that 
society is prepared to recognize as "reasonable."). 
8. See infra Section III(A)(l)(a) for a description of the law regulating 
search warrants and the mail. 
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Upon arnvmg at the suspect's residence, the police show the 
suspect the warrant and gain access to his computer. The police do 
not find any evidence on the computer's physical hard drive, but a 
computer specialist notes that there is evidence that the suspect has 
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somebody may go through it;9 a cloud user does not have the same 
belief. 10 
This Note discusses the Fourth Amendment's protection of the 
cloud by first explaining exactly what the cloud is and how it differs 
from other technology, thus establishing why existing computer search 
methodologies do not apply to the cloud. Therefore, the law must 
adhere to three principles. First, pursuant to Katz, there is a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the cloud. Second, executing a 
warrant to search a physical computer, pursuant to existing computer 
search doctrine, does not encompass the cloud. Third, law 
enforcement officers cannot apply an exception to circumvent the 
warrant requirement. 
When police officers have a valid warrant to search a home 
computer, the search must start and end there. If the police find 
evidence that the user has a cloud account, the Fourth Amendment 
prohibits them from immediately accessing the cloud. The additional 
search warrant is necessary because there is a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in the cloud. Subsequently, a law enforcement agent has 
only one option when he wants to search a cloud network account: get 
a warrant. 
II. WHAT IS THE CLOUD? 
To understand why the Fourth Amendment protects the cloud, 
one must understand what the cloud is, why using the cloud is 
different than using a personal computer, and what sort of privacy 
implications are involved in cloud network usage. 
A. Overview 
Many people, even those with a technological background, 
struggle to understand the cloud's purpose and functions. 11 Put 
9. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40-41 (1988) (noting that thus, 
there would be no reasonable expectation of privacy in the items they 
discarded). 
10. John B. Horrigan, Data Memo, Use of Cloud Computing Applications 
and Services, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT (Sept. 12, 2008) 
available at http://www.pewinternet.org/Reports/2008/Use-of-Cloud-
Computing-A pplications-and-Services /Data-Memo.aspx [hereinafter 
Horrigan] (reporting high levels of concern from cloud network users 
when asked about how they would feel if the cloud network provider 
took various actions with their data). 
11. In fact, as recently as 2008, when cloud computing was "new," even the 
high-profile players in the technological industry believed that the cloud 
was just "re branding" current technology. See Dan Farber, Oracle's 
Ellison nails cloud computing, CNET NEWS (Sept. 26, 2008, 12:09 PM) 
http://news.cnet.com/8301-13953_3-10052188-80.html (reporting 
Ellison's disclosure of the "truth" about cloud computing: "[t]he 
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simply, cloud computing is a metaphor for the "newest" way to use 
the Internet. 12 Despite this initial confusion, nearly sixty-nine percent 
of Americans have used the cloud network in some fashion. 13 Both 
individuals and companies utilize the cloud in a similar manner. In 
lieu of a traditional internal server,14 the cloud network allows the 
user to run services and programs on an external server, 15 which 
essentially allows the user to outsource these processes. 16 Thus, users 
are switching to cloud computing because it provides the same 
traditional type of networking and file storage capacities for a fraction 
of the price.17 In fact, individuals and businesses alike are buying 
cheaper and less sophisticated machines because large hard drives are 
no longer necessary; users can stream programs, such as word 
processing or online gaming, directly from the cloud.18 
Similarly, utilizing cloud storage involves exactly what the name 
suggests-storing files and media in a personal account on the cloud 
rather than on a local system.19 Notable cloud storage providers 
include Dropbox,20 Amazon,21 Apple,22 and Google,23 but there are 
interesting thing about cloud computing is that we've redefined cloud 
computing to include everything that that we already do."). 
12. See VELTE, supra note 1, at 3 (describing the cloud network, how it 
works, the different uses for the cloud, and the various providers, among 
related things). 
13. Horrigan, supra note 10 (showing users' different concerns regarding 
privacy of their data). 
14. See Ngo II, supra note 3 (explaining that internal servers, or 'network 
attached storage' serves the purpose to "connectO to a network and 
make its storage space available to all devices in the same local 
network."). 
15. See VELTE, supra note 1, at 4, 7-8 ("[C]loud computing is a construct 
that allows you to access applications that actually reside at a location 
other than your computer or other Internet-connected device; most 
often, this will be a distant datacenter." At datacenter is a collection of 
servers that may be located anywhere, and not necessarily in the same 
location). 
16. See Roger Cheng, 'Cloud Computing': What Exactly Is It, Anyway?, 
WALL ST. J., Feb. 8, 2010, at R2 (detailing the numerous uses of cloud 
computing for businesses). 
17. See VELTE, supra note 1, at 4 (explaining how business save money by 
using the cloud, not only by reducing the costs of buying and licensing 
programs, but also by reducing the cost of utilities and eliminating the 
need to buy some programs all together). 
18. Id. at 7 (describing the concept of a "thin" client (computer) and why 
use of this type of machine is becoming increasingly popular). 
19. Id. at 135 - 151 (providing a generalized overview of cloud storage). 
20. DROPBOX, https://www.dropbox.com/ (last visited Mar. 26, 2012). 
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many others. Recently, these companies have brought the cloud into 
the public eye. 24 The services cloud service providers offer range from 
a simplistic on-stop "shopping" experience to more complicated 
systems, requiring multiple stops for a complete cloud-computing 
experience. 25 
Depending on which cloud network service provider a user 
chooses, his files or documents that are saved on the cloud are 
located on remote servers located all over the world.26 This essentially 
allows the user to treat his cloud account as a portable hard drive to 
retrieve his documents and files from any computer with Internet 
access.
27 In some cases, the user does not have to download 
additional software to his computer to access the files he has stored 
on the cloud. 28 For example, Dropbox users simply log into their 
account via Dropbox's homepage in order to access their stored 
21. AMAZON, 
https://www.amazon.com/clouddrive/learnmore/ref=sa menu acd Im 
2 (last visited Mar. 26, 2012); see, e.g., Rob Pegoraro~ Ama;;n Cloud 
Player puts your music on the Web, WASH. POST (March 29, 2011, 5:58 
AM) http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/faster-forward/post/ 
amazon-cloud-player-puts-your-music-on-the-web /2011 /03 /29 / 
AFBJ5jsB_blog.html; see also, e.g., Stu Woo & Geoffrey A. Fowler, 
Amazon Cloud Boosts Fire, WALL ST. J. Sept. 30, 2011, at B2 (detailing 
the uses of Amazon's "cloud," which Amazon not only rents to 
companies such as Netflix, Inc., and Zynga, Inc., but also uses it to 
power searches on the Kindle Fire through the internet browser 
Amazon Silk). ' 
22. APPLE ICLOUD, http://www.apple.com/icloud/ (last visited Mar. 26, 
2012); see, e.g., David Goldman, What to Expect from Apple's iCloud, 
CNN (June 1, 2011, 3:16 PM), http://money.cnn.com/ 
~Oll/06/01/tech11:o.logy/apple_icloud/index.htm (discussing the way the 
iCloud may be utilized to store and play music). 
23. E.g., G_OOGLE: ~PPS FOR BUSINESS, http://www.google.com/apps/intl/ 
en/busmess/off1ceconnect.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2012). 
24. See Brian X. Chen, From iCloud to Dropbox: 5 Cloud Computing 
Services Co:npared, WIRED (June 20, 2011, 3:05 PM), 
http//www.wired.com/gadgetlab/2011/06/cloud-services-compared 
[heremafter Chen] (comparing the five major cloud computing services). 
25. See id. (comparing Amazon ("Amazon's Cloud Drive is as 
straightforward as a cloud service gets: It's just an online storage 
locker.") to Google ("Google's "cloud" suite can be confusing: There's no 
one-stop destination that hosts all your media.")). 
26. See VELTE, supra note 1, at 8 ("Amazon has their cloud solution in 
servers all over the world."). 
27. See id. at 137 (listing various cloud providers and the types of files they 
specialize in storing). 
28. See e.g., DROPBOX, https://www.dropbox.com. 
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documents. 29 Users do not need to install any additional programs on 
a computer to access their Dropbox account; rather, they can access 
their data on public computers with relative ease. 
However, Dropbox operates differently from other cloud providers. 
Dropbox saves copies of a user's files or media to the user's "base" 
computer, the computer to which the user has installed the Dropbox 
software.30 Other cloud network programs do not have this feature. 
Cloud providers such as Google Drive allow users to create, modify, 
and save entire document on the cloud.31 Google Drive provides an 
entire word processing program to its users, and the user never has to 
save the document to his personal computer.32 
B. Why People Use the Cloud Network 
It is estimated that by 2020, "most" people will use the cloud 
network to access software applications online, as well as to store and 
access their data, in lieu of using traditional personal computers.33 
This is because of the cloud network's ease and convenience; when 
data is stored on the cloud, a user can access his materials "via an 
internet link" from whatever computer or device he wishes.34 So long 
as the user has access to a "web-based interface," which essentially 
includes any device that is capable of internet access; such as a 
laptop, smartphone, tablet, or netbook, he may store or access data 
on the cloud. 35 Furthermore, the cloud provides a simple way for 
users to back up their data in another location. If, in an extreme 
scenario, a tornado ripped through a home and destroyed a user's 
29. 
30. 
31. 
32. 
33. 
34. 
35. 
Id. (Log-In box). 
See DROPBOX: FEATURES, https://www.dropbox.com/features (last 
visited Mar. 26, 2012) ("Any file you save to Dropbox also instantly 
saves to your computers, phones, and the Dropbox website."). 
See GOOGLE DRIVE, http://www.google.com/drive/start/apps.html# 
product=docs (last visited Oct. 30, 2012). 
See id. (describing the Google Docs feature of Google Drive, which 
allows the creation and editing of documents entirely on the cloud). 
Janna Quitney Anderson & Lee Rainie, The Future of Cloud 
Computing, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT (June 11, 2010) 
available at http://pewinternet.org/Reports /2010 /The-future-of-cloud-
computing/ Overview .aspx. (basing this theory off an internet study). 
See VELTE, supra note 1, at 135 ("As with other cloud services, you can 
access the data stored on the cloud via an internet link."); see also 
Chen, supra note 24 ("Have music on your PC that you want to listen 
to on your smartphone? Boom, stream it from the cloud. Want to 
access a document on another computer? Barn, grab it from your web-
connected "cloud" drive."). 
VELTE, supra note 1, at 136 (describing the use of cloud computing 
technology). 
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many others. Recently, these companies have brought the cloud into 
the public eye. 24 The services cloud service providers offer range from 
a simplistic on-stop "shopping" experience to more complicated 
systems, requiring multiple stops for a complete cloud-computing 
experience. 25 
Depending on which cloud network service provider a user 
chooses, his files or documents that are saved on the cloud are 
located on remote servers located all over the world. 26 This essentially 
allows the user to treat his cloud account as a portable hard drive to 
retrieve his documents and files from any computer with Internet 
access.
27 
In some cases, the user does not have to download 
additional software to his computer to access the files he has stored 
on the cloud. 28 For example, Drop box users simply log into their 
account via Dropbox's homepage in order to access their stored 
21. AMAZON, 
22. 
23. 
24. 
25. 
26. 
27. 
28. 
https://www.amazon.com/clouddrive/learnmore/ref=sa_menu acd lrn 
2 (last visited Mar. 26, 2012); see, e.g., Rob Pegoraro, Ama~n Cloud 
Player puts your music on the Web, WASH. POST (March 29, 2011, 5:58 
AM) http://www. washingtonpost .com/blogs /faster-forward/ post/ 
amazo11;-cloud-player-puts-your-music-on-the-web/2011/03/29/ 
AFBJ5JsB_blog.html; see also, e.g., Stu Woo & Geoffrey A. Fowler, 
Amazon Cloud Boosts Fire, WALL ST. J. Sept. 30, 2011, at B2 (detailing 
the uses of Amazon's "cloud," which Amazon not only rents to 
companies such as N etflix, Inc., and Zynga, Inc., but also uses it to 
power searches on the Kindle Fire through the internet browser 
Amazon Silk). ' 
APPLE ICLOUD, http://www.apple.com/icloud/ (last visited Mar. 26, 
2012); see, e.g., David Goldman, What to Expect from Apple's iCloud, 
CNN (June 1, 2011, 3:16 PM), http://money.cnn.com/ 
~011/06/01/technology/apple_icloud/index.htm (discussing the way the 
iCloud may be utilized to store and play music). 
E.g., c:ooGLE: ~PPS FOR BUSINESS, http://www.google.com/apps/intl/ 
en/busmess/off1ceconnect.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2012). 
See Brian X. Chen, From iCloud to Dropbox: 5 Cloud Computing 
Services Co:npared, WIRED (June 20, 2011, 3:05 PM), 
http/ /www.wired.com/gadgetlab/2011/06/cloud-services-compared 
[heremafter Chen] (comparing the five major cloud computing services). 
See id. (comparing Amazon ("Amazon's Cloud Drive is as 
straightforward as a cloud service gets: It's just an online storage 
locker.") to Google ("Google's "cloud" suite can be confusing: There's no 
one-stop destination that hosts all your media.")). 
See VELTE, supra note 1, at 8 ("Amazon has their cloud solution in 
servers all over the world."). 
See id. at 137 (listing various cloud providers and the types of files they 
specialize in storing). 
See e.g., DROPBOX, https://www.dropbox.com. 
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documents.29 Users do not need to install any additional programs on 
a computer to access their Dropbox account; rather, they can access 
their data on public computers with relative ease. 
However, Dropbox operates differently from other cloud providers. 
Dropbox saves copies of a user's files or media to the user's "base" 
computer, the computer to which the user has installed the Drop box 
software.30 Other cloud network programs do not have this feature. 
Cloud providers such as Google Drive allow users to create, modify, 
and save entire document on the cloud. 31 Google Drive provides an 
entire word processing program to its users, and the user never has to 
save the document to his personal computer.32 
B. Why People Use the Cloud Network 
It is estimated that by 2020, "most" people will use the cloud 
network to access software applications online, as well as to store and 
access their data, in lieu of using traditional personal computers.33 
This is because of the cloud network's ease and convenience; when 
data is stored on the cloud, a user can access his materials "via an 
internet link" from whatever computer or device he wishes.34 So long 
as the user has access to a "web-based interface," which essentially 
includes any device that is capable of internet access; such as a 
laptop, smartphone, tablet, or netbook, he may store or access data 
on the cloud.35 Furthermore, the cloud provides a simple way for 
users to back up their data in another location. If, in an extreme 
scenario, a tornado ripped through a home and destroyed a user's 
29. 
30. 
31. 
32. 
33. 
34. 
35. 
Id. (Log-In box). 
See DROPBOX: FEATURES, https://www.dropbox.com/features (last 
visited Mar. 26 2012) ("Any file you save to Dropbox also instantly 
' ") saves to your computers, phones, and the Dropbox website. . 
See GOOGLE DRIVE, http://www.google.com/drive/start/apps.html# 
product=docs (last visited Oct. 30, 2012). 
See id. (describing the Google Docs feature of Google Drive, which 
allows the creation and editing of documents entirely on the cloud). 
Janna Quitney Anderson & Lee Rainie, The Future of Cloud 
Computing, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT (June 11, 2010) 
available at http://pewinternet.org/Reports/2010/The-future-of-cloud-
computing/Overview.aspx. (basing this theory off an internet study). 
See VELTE, supra note 1, at 135 ("As with other cloud services, you can 
access the data stored on the cloud via an internet link."); see also 
Chen, supra note 24 ("Have music on your PC that you want to listen 
to on your smartphone? Boom, stream it from the cloud. Want to 
access a document on another computer? Barn, grab it from your web-
connected "cloud" drive."). 
VELTE, supra note 1, at 136 (describing the use of cloud computing 
technology). 
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computer and local back-ups, a copy of his personal files would still be 
safe, stored on a remote server miles away.36 
Moreover, users may have access to nearly unlimited space on the 
cloud. Users can sign up for the basic free package from the cloud 
provider, which allows them to store anywhere from one to five 
gigabytes37 of material.38 Alternatively, consumers with greater needs 
may choose to purchase as much as sixteen terabytes of storage from 
a cloud provider. 39 This means that a user could store all of his files 
and media on the cloud. 
C. Can a Cloud Service Provider Access or Share Your Files? 
. When a cloud service provider accesses users' files, it is typically 
m order to comply with a court order or law enforcement.40 However 
it is important to note that nearly half of cloud network users woultl 
be "very" concerned if the cloud network provider immediately gave 
law enforcement their files when law enforcement asked the provider 
to do so.41 Although the study was conducted several years ago it 
showed that even when the cloud network use was not as preval~nt 
users expected that the files and media they save on the cloud woultl 
remain private.42 Indeed, cloud users do not expect that a cloud 
network provider will hand their data to law enforcement without a 
second thought. 
Cloud service providers explain when a user's stored files and 
media will be accessed in privacy policies and terms of service. For 
example, Dropbox's Terms of Service states that the provider will not 
share users' files with anyone, including law enforcement except for 
" t• " h ' rare excep 10ns or w en the user provides permission.43 Dropbox's 
36. 
37. 
38. 
39. 
40. 
41. 
42. 
43. 
See Eric A. Taub, Storing Your Files Inside the Cloud, N.Y. TIMES, 
March 3, 2011, at B7 ("Backing up to an external hard drive doesn't 
help whe~ your house burns or a tornado tears off the roof. If your 
~omputer is destroyed, your hard drive, stored 10 feet away in a closet 
is probably gone too."). ' 
S_ee Ngo, supra note 3 (describing the units of data storage, such as 
gigabyte and terabyte, and how they relate to one another). 
See _Chen, supra note 24 (see chart for different types of cloud 
providers). 
Id. (such as Windows Live and Dropbox). 
See, ~.g., D:~lOPBOX: PRIVACY POLICY, https://www.dropbox.com/ 
secunty#pnvacy (last visited Mar. 26, 2012) (indicating when and how 
they comply with law enforcement). 
Horrigan, supra note 10 (regarding attitudes about possible data policies 
of cloud services). 
Id. 
DROPBOX: TERMS OF SERVICE https://www.dropbox.com/terms (last 
visited Mar. 26, 2012). ' 
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Security Terms state that the only information it will view about 
users' files is the file's metadata, which includes the file's name or 
location.44 Google's privacy policy is much more complicated, but 
generally implies that it will not share personal information except in 
limited situations, including when requested by law enforcement.45 It 
is important to note that this provision only refers to personal 
information, and does . not specifically address documents stored on 
the cloud. Google also reserves the right to examine the content of 
anything the website hosts. 46 Amazon is notorious for granting the 
least amount of privacy protection on its cloud.47 Amazon warns 
users that when they utilize Amazon's cloud service provider, the user 
grants Amazon unlimited access to the files. 48 However, Amazon's 
justifications include compliance with any applicable laws.49 Some 
cloud providers take extra measures to protect user's data, which 
includes encryption of said data while it is in storage.50 To the 
ultimate extreme, one provider takes a "zero knowledge" approach to 
their cloud storage offering. 51 SpiderOak encrypts all data, does not 
44. 
45. 
46. 
47. 
48. 
49. 
50. 
51. 
DROPBOX: SEC. TERMS, https://www.dropbox.com/security (last visited 
Mar. 26, 2012). 
GOOGLE PRIVACY CENTER, http://www.google.com/intl/en/ 
privacy/privacy-policy.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2012) ("[W]e have a 
good faith belief that access, use, preservation or disclosure of such 
information is reasonably necessary to (a) satisfy any applicable law, 
regulation, legal process or enforceable governmental request."). 
GOOGLE TERMS OF SERVICE, https://www.google.com/intl/ 
en/policies/terms/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2012) 
("We may review content to determine whether it is ille?al or 
violates our policies, and we may remove or refuse to display 
content that we reasonably believe violates our policies or the 
law. But that does not necessarily mean that we review content, 
so please don't assume that we do."). 
See Steven J. Vaughan-Nichols, No Privacy on Amazon's Cloud Drive, 
ZDNET (Mar. 29, 2011, 9:02 AM) http://www.zdnet.com/ 
blog/ networking/ no-privacy-on-amazons-cloud-drive/ 882?tag=nl.e539 
("Amazon can do pretty much anything they want with your files"). 
AMAZON TERMS OF USE, Section 5.2: Our Right to Access Your Files, 
http://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html/ref=hp_2005 
57340_tou?nodeld=200557360 (last visited Mar. 26, 2012). 
Id. 
CRASHPLAN, Sec. Details, http://www.crashplan.com/consumer/ 
security.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2012) (detailing data security and 
protection) . 
SPIDEROAK, Is SpiderOak really "zero knowledge"'? Could you read a 
user's data if forced at gunpoint'?, https://spideroak.com/faq/ 
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computer and local back-ups, a copy of his personal files would still be 
safe, stored on a remote server miles away.36 
Moreover, users may have access to nearly unlimited space on the 
clou~. Users can sign up for the basic free package from the cloud 
provider, which allows them to store anywhere from one to five 
gigabytes37 of material.38 Alternatively, consumers with greater needs 
may choose to purchase as much as sixteen terabytes of storage from 
a cloud provider. 39 This means that a user could store all of his files 
and media on the cloud. 
C. Can a Cloud Service Provider Access or Share Your Files? 
. When a cloud service provider accesses users' files, it is typically 
m order to comply with a court order or law enforcement.40 However 
it is important to note that nearly half of cloud network users would 
b " " d 'f h e very concerne I t e cloud network provider immediately gave 
law enforcement their files when law enforcement asked the provider 
to do so.41 Although the study was conducted several years ago it 
showed that even when the cloud network use was not as preval~nt 
users expected that the files and media they save on the cloud would 
remain private.42 Indeed, cloud users do not expect that a cloud 
network provider will hand their data to law enforcement without a 
second thought. 
Cloud service providers explain when a user's stored files and 
media will be accessed in privacy policies and terms of service. For 
example, Dropbox's Terms of Service states that the provider will not 
share users' files with anyone, including law enforcement except for 
" t• " h ' rare excep 10ns or w en the user provides permission.43 Dropbox's 
36. 
37. 
38. 
39. 
40. 
41. 
42. 
43. 
See Eric A. Taub, Storing Your Files Inside the Cloud, N.Y. TIMES, 
March 3, 2011, at B7 ("Backing up to an external hard drive doesn't 
help whe~ your house burns or a tornado tears off the roof. If your 
~omputer is destroyed, your hard drive, stored 10 feet away in a closet, 
is probably gone too."). 
S_ee Ngo, supra note 3 (describing the units of data storage, such as 
gigabyte and terabyte, and how they relate to one another). 
See Chen, supra note 24 (see chart for different types of cloud 
providers). 
Id. (such as Windows Live and Drop box). 
See, ~.g., DI_WPBOX: Pru:r~cy POLICY, https://www.dropbox.com/ 
secunty#pnvacy (last v1s1ted Mar. 26, 2012) (indicating when and how 
they comply with law enforcement). 
Horrigan, supra note 10 (regarding attitudes about possible data policies 
of cloud services). 
Id. 
DROPBOX: TERMS OF SERVICE https://www.dropbox.com/terms (last 
visited Mar. 26, 2012). ' 
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Security Terms state that the only information it will view about 
users' files is the file's metadata, which includes the file's name or 
location.44 Google's privacy policy is much more complicated, but 
generally implies that it will not share personal information except in 
limited situations, including when requested by law enforcement.45 It 
is important to note that this provision only refers to personal 
information, and does . not specifically address documents stored on 
the cloud. Google also reserves the right to examine the content of 
anything the website hosts.46 Amazon is notorious for granting the 
least amount of privacy protection on its cloud.47 Amazon warns 
users that when they utilize Amazon's cloud service provider, the user 
grants Amazon unlimited access to the files. 48 However, Amazon's 
justifications include compliance with any applicable laws.49 Some 
cloud. providers take extra measures to protect user's data, which 
includes encryption of said data while it is in storage.50 To the 
ultimate extreme, one provider takes a "zero knowledge" approach to 
their cloud storage offering. 51 SpiderOak encrypts all data, does not 
44. 
45. 
46. 
47. 
48. 
49. 
50. 
51. 
DROPBOX: SEC. TERMS, https://www.dropbox.com/security (last visited 
Mar. 26, 2012). 
GOOGLE PRIVACY CENTER, http://www.google.com/intl/en/ 
privacy /privacy-policy.html (last visited Mar._ 26, 201~) ("[W]e have a 
good faith belief that access, use, preservat10~ or d1sclosu:e of such 
information is reasonably necessary to (a) satisfy any applicable law, 
regulation, legal process or enforceable governmental request."). 
GOOGLE TERMS OF SERVICE, https://www.google.com/intl/ 
en/policies/terms/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2012) 
("We may review content to determine whether it is ille~al or 
violates our policies, and we may remove or refuse to display 
content that we reasonably believe violates our policies or the 
law. But that does not necessarily mean that we review content, 
so please don't assume that we do."). 
See Steven J. Vaughan-Nichols, No Privacy on Amazon's Cloud Drive, 
ZDNET (Mar. 29, 2011, 9:02 AM) http://www.zd~et.com/ 
blog/ networking/ no-privacy-on-amazons-cloud-drive/ ~82 ?tag=~L ~~39 
("Amazon can do pretty much anything they want with your files ). 
AMAZON TERMS OF USE, Section 5.2: Our Right to Access Your Files, 
http:/ /www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html/ref=hp_2005 
57340_tou?nodeld=200557360 (last visited Mar. 26, 2012). 
Id. 
CRASHPLAN, Sec. Details, http://www.crashplan.com/consumer/ 
security.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2012) (detailing data security and 
protection). 
SPIDEROAK, Is SpiderOak really "zero knowledge"? Could you read a 
user's data if forced at gunpoint?, https://spideroak.com/faq/ 
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save user's passwords, and does not know the names of stored files or 
folders; the company advertises that "[y]our SpiderOak data is 
readable to you alone. "52 
The commonality existing among these examples is that service 
providers retain the means to comply with law enforcement requests. 
The implications this has on the cloud's Fourth Amendment 
protections are discussed below. 
III. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND COMPUTERS 
One of the central concepts of American privacy law is the 
freedom from governmental intrusion. 53 The Founders drafted. this 
freedom directly into the Constitution as part of the Fourth 
Amendment, which prevents the government from conducting 
unreasonable searches or seizures and sets forth the warrant 
requirements. 54 The Fourth Amendment's protections encompass 
modern technology even though this technology did not exist at the 
time of the Amendment's ratification, for the Fourth Amendment 
protects against all unreasonable searches and seizures. 
A. Issuing Warrants 
The Fourth Amendment requires that a valid warrant only issue 
on "probable cause, supported by an oath or affirmation that 
particularly describes the place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized. "55 These requirements prevent the issuance of 
generalized warrants, and protect the privacy of those whose homes, 
selves, and effects the police are searching.56 
This Note focuses on probable cause and the particularity 
requirement. When the magistrate is reviewing the proposed search 
questions/23/is_spideroak_really_zero_knowledge_could_you_read_a 
_users_data_if_forced_at_gunpoint/ (last visited Mar. 26, 2012) 
(giving an overview of its "zero knowledge" privacy policy). 
52. SPIDEROAK, Nuts f:f Bolts: True Privacy, https://spideroak.com/ 
engineering_matters (last visited Mar. 26, 2012). (showing the difference 
between SpiderOak and other cloud storage providers). 
53. See DANIEL J. SOLOVE, NOTHING TO HIDE 4 (Yale University Press) 
(2011) [hereinafter SOLOVE]. 
54. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. ("The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures shall not be violated."). 
55. Id. 
56. See Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 482 n.11 (1976) (noting that 
the police must take care when sorting through papers, whose 
evidentiary value is not immediately ascertainable, to "minimizeO 
unwarranted intrusions upon privacy."). 
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warrant, he may consider placing additional restrictions. Allowing 
the magistrate to impose these restrictions in order to enforce the 
warrant's particularity requirements ultimately helps prevent law 
enforcement agents from overreaching and protects privacy. 
1. The Expectation of Privacy 
The Fourth Amendment protects all people from unreasonable 
searches and seizures. 57 Unless the search falls into one of numerous 
exceptions, the Fourth Amendment requires that the police obtain a 
warrant, based on probable cause, before conducting a search.58 The 
issue of whether a governmental intrusion constitutes a search has 
been, and continues to be, a hotly contested issue. 
In 1967, the Supreme Court held in Katz, that the Fourth 
Amendment's protections against unreasonable searches and seizures 
"protectO people, not places. "59 Justice Harlan set forth a two-part 
test in his concurrence, for whether the "area" is protected by the 
Fourth Amendment: first, the individual must have expressed an 
expectation of privacy in the place to be searched; and second, this 
expectation must be one that society is prepared to recognize as 
reasonable.60 This test has been adopted as the predominant 
approach to evaluating the Fourth Amendment's protections. "What 
a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or 
office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what 
he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the 
public, may be constitutionally protected. "61 If an officer invades this 
reasonable expectation of privacy absent a search warrant, he has 
conducted an illegal search.62 
Since Katz, the Supreme Court has slowly enunciated where a 
person has a reasonable expectation of privacy. The Court refused to 
expand the Fourth Amendment's protections to areas such as open 
fields, due in part to the fact that "open fields are accessible to the 
public."63 However, in Kyllo v. United States, the Court expressed 
that there is always a reasonable expectation of privacy in one's 
57. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
58. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(d)(l). 
59. 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). 
60. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
61. Id. at 351-52. 
62. Id. at 359 ("Wherever a man may be, he is entitled to know that he will 
remain free from unreasonable searches and seizures."). 
63. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 179 (1984) ("Open fields do not 
provide the setting for those intimate activities that the Amendment is 
intended to shelter from government interference or surveillance."). 
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save user's passwords, and does not know the names of stored files or 
folders; the company advertises that "[y]our SpiderOak data is 
readable to you alone. "52 
The commonality existing among these examples is that service 
providers retain the means to comply with law enforcement requests. 
The implications this has on the cloud's Fourth Amendment 
protections are discussed below. 
III. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND COMPUTERS 
One of the central concepts of American privacy law is the 
freedom from governmental intrusion. 53 The Founders drafted this 
freedom directly into the Constitution as part of the Fourth 
Amendment, which prevents the government from conducting 
unreasonable searches or seizures and sets forth the warrant 
requirements. 54 The Fourth Amendment's protections encompass 
modern technology even though this technology did not exist at the 
time of the Amendment's ratification, for the Fourth Amendment 
protects against all unreasonable searches and seizures. 
A. Issuing Warrants 
The Fourth Amendment requires that a valid warrant only issue 
on "probable cause, supported by an oath or affirmation that 
particularly describes the place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized. "55 These requirements prevent the issuance of 
generalized warrants, and protect the privacy of those whose homes, 
selves, and effects the police are searching.56 
This Note focuses on probable cause and the particularity 
requirement. When the magistrate is reviewing the proposed search 
questions/23/is_spideroak_really_zero_knowledge_could_you_read_a 
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(giving an overview of its "zero knowledge" privacy policy). 
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seizures shall not be violated."). 
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evidentiary value is not immediately ascertainable, to "minimizeO 
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warrant, he may consider placing additional restrictions. Allowing 
the magistrate to impose these restrictions in order to enforce the 
warrant's particularity requirements ultimately helps prevent law 
enforcement agents from overreaching and protects privacy. 
1. The Expectation of Privacy 
The Fourth Amendment protects all people from unreasonable 
searches and seizures.57 Unless the search falls into one of numerous 
exceptions, the Fourth Amendment requires that the police obtain a 
warrant, based on probable cause, before conducting a search.58 The 
issue of whether a governmental intrusion constitutes a search has 
been, and continues to be, a hotly contested issue. 
In 1967, the Supreme Court held in Katz, that the Fourth 
Amendment's protections against unreasonable searches and seizures 
"protectO people, not places. "59 Justice Harlan set forth a two-part 
test in his concurrence, for whether the "area" is protected by the 
Fourth Amendment: first, the individual must have expressed an 
expectation of privacy in the place to be searched; and second, this 
expectation must be one that society is prepared to recognize as 
reasonable. 60 This test has been adopted as the predominant 
approach to evaluating the Fourth Amendment's protections. "What 
a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or 
office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what 
he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the 
public, may be constitutionally protected. "61 If an officer invades this 
reasonable expectation of privacy absent a search warrant, he has 
conducted an illegal search. 62 
Since Katz, the Supreme Court has slowly enunciated where a 
person has a reasonable expectation of privacy. The Court refused to 
expand the Fourth Amendment's protections to areas such as open 
fields, due in part to the fact that "open fields are accessible to the 
public. "63 However, in Kyllo v. United States, the Court expressed 
that there is always a reasonable expectation of privacy in one's 
57. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
58. FED. R. CRIM. P. 4l(d)(l). 
59. 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). 
60. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
61. Id. at 351-52. 
62. Id. at 359 ("Wherever a man may be, he is entitled to know that he will 
remain free from unreasonable searches and seizures."). 
63. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 179 (1984) ("Open fields do not 
provide the setting for those intimate activities that the Amendment is 
intended to shelter from government interference or surveillance."). 
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home.64 This reasonable expectation of privacy extends to the 
personal items contained within one's home, which, by default, 
include any computers that the resident may· own. 65 However, once 
inside the home with a valid warrant, police may search for the items 
listed on the warrant in places where these items are reasonably 
expected to be.66 
The following are examples of areas where the expectation of 
privacy has. been evaluated to determine whether the Fourth 
Amendment's warrant requirement applies. These examples hold 
commonalities with the cloud network, and application of these 
principles gives insight into why the Fourth Amendment protects the 
cloud. 
i. Mail 
Americans enjoy an expectation of privacy in the mail; the 
government will not search their mail once the sender has relinquished 
it to a branch of the federal government, the USPS, for delivery. 
This expectation of privacy is historically well-established. In 1878, 
the Supreme Court in Ex Parle Jackson stated that, "[l]etters and 
sealed packages ... in the mail are as fully guarded from examination 
and inspection, except as to their outward form and weight, as if they 
were retained by the parties forwarding them in their own 
domiciles."67 The Court established that obtaining a warrant, "as is 
required when papers are subjected to search in one's own household," 
is the only way an officer may open mail and examine its contents 
64. 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) ("[I]n the case of the search of the interior of 
homes - the prototypical and hence most commonly litigated area of 
protected privacy - there is. a ready criterion, with roots deep in the 
GOmmon law, of the minimal expectation of privacy that exists, and that 
is acknowledged to be reasonable."). 
65. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589-90 (1980) (discussing how 
the Fourth Amendment draws a strict line when law enforcement enters 
a private home). 
66. See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 820-21 (i982) ("A lawful search 
of fixed premises generally extends to the entire area in which the object 
of the search may be found and is not limited by the possibility that 
separate acts of entry or opening may be required to complete the 
search. Thus, a warrant that authorizes an officer to search a home for 
illegal weapons also provides authority to open closets, chests, drawers, 
and containers in which the weapon might be found."); see also YALE 
KAMISAR ET AL., MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 317 (12th ed. 2008) 
("[The police] may only look where the items described in the warrant 
might be concealE'.d. For example, if a search warrant indicated that the 
items sought were stolen television sets, the officer would not be 
authorized to rummage through desk drawers."). 
67. 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1878). 
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prior to it reaching its destination.68 Officers must honor the warrant 
requirement even when the piece of mail is suspicious and likely 
contains something illegal. 69 An officer may detain the mail for the 
period of time that it takes him to obtain a warrant, but may not 
open and search the mail until a warrant has been obtained.70 
ii. Trash 
It has long been held that there is no expectation of privacy in 
garbage that has been relinquished on the side of the road. 71 In 
California v. Greenwood, the respondent challenged the admissibility 
of evidence that the police obtained by asking the garbage collector to 
keep his garbage separate, and then seizing it to conduct a search.72 
The Supreme Court found that the police's actions did not violate the 
Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and 
seizures and noted that: 
[R]espondents placed their refuse at the curb for the express 
purpose of conveying it to a third party, the trash collector, who 
might himself have sorted through respondents' trash or 
permitted others, such as the police, to do so. Accordingly, 
having deposited their garbage "in an area particularly suited 
for public inspection and, in ·a manner of speaking, public 
consumption, for the express purpose of having strangers take 
it[.]73 
68. Id. ("No law of Congress can place in the hands of officials connected 
with the postal service any authority to invade the secrecy of letters and 
such sealed packages in the mail; and all regulations adopted as to mail 
matter of this kind must be in subordination to the great principle 
embodied in the fourth amendment of the Constitution."). 
69. See United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249, 252 (1970) ("[N]o law 
of Congress can place in the hands of officials connected with the postal 
service any authority to invade the secrecy of letters . . . and all 
regulations adopted as to mail matter must be in subordination to the 
great principle embodied in the fourth amendment of the 
Constitution."). 
70. Id. at 253 ("The significant Fourth Amendment interest was in the 
privacy of this first-class mail; and that privacy was not disturbed or 
invaded until the approval of the magistrate was obtained."). 
71. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 41-42 (1988) ("Our conclusion 
that society would not accept as reasonable respondents' claim to an 
expectation of privacy in trash left for collection in an area accessible to 
the public is reinforced by the unanimous rejection of similar claims by 
the Federal Courts of Appeals."). 
72. Id. at 38. 
73. Id. at 40-41(citation omitted). 
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home.64 This reasonable expectation of privacy extends to the 
personal items contained within one's home, which, by default, 
include any computers that the resident may· own. 65 However, once 
inside the home with a valid warrant, police may search for the items 
listed on the warrant in places where these items are reasonably 
expected to be.66 
The following are examples of areas where the expectation of 
privacy has_ been evaluated to determine whether the Fourth 
Amendment's warrant requirement applies. These examples hold 
commonalities with the cloud network, and application of these 
principles gives insight into why the Fourth Amendment protects the 
cloud. 
i. Mail 
Americans enjoy an expectation of privacy in the mail; the 
government will not search their mail once the sender has relinquished 
it to a branch of the federal government, the USPS, for delivery. 
This expectation of privacy is historically well-established. In 1878, 
the Supreme Court in Ex Parle Jackson stated that, "[l]etters and 
sealed packages . . . in the mail are as fully guarded from examination 
and inspection, except as to their outward form and weight, as if they 
were retained by the parties forwarding them in their own 
domiciles."67 The Court established that obtaining a warrant, "as is 
required when papers are subjected to search in one's own household," 
is the only way an officer may open mail and examine its contents 
64. 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) ("[I]n the case of the search of the interior of 
homes - the prototypical and hence most commonly litigated area of 
protected privacy - there is. a ready criterion, with roots deep in the 
c;ommon law, of the minimal expectation of privacy that exists, and that 
is acknowledged to be reasonable."). 
65. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589-90 (1980) (discussing how 
the Fourth Amendment draws a strict line when law enforcement enters 
a private home). 
66. See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 820-21 (i982) ("A lawful search 
of fixed premises generally extends to the entire area in which the object 
of the search may be found and is not limited by the possibility that 
separate acts of entry or opening may be required to complete the 
search. Thus, a warrant that authorizes an officer to search a home for 
illegal weapons also provides authority to open closets, chests, drawers, 
and containers in which the weapon might be found."); see also YALE 
KAMISAR ET AL., MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 317 (12th ed. 2008) 
("[The police] may only look where the items described in the warrant 
might be concealE'.d. For example, if a search warrant indicated that the 
items sought were stolen television sets, the officer would not be 
authorized to rummage through desk drawers."). 
67. 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1878). 
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prior to it reaching its destination. 68 Officers must honor the warrant 
requirement even when the piece of mail is suspicious and likely 
contains something illegal.69 An officer may detain the mail for the 
period of time that it takes him to obtain a warrant, but may not 
open and search the mail until a warrant has been obtained.70 
ii. Trash 
It has long been held that there is no expectation of privacy in 
garbage that has been relinquished on the side of the road. 71 In 
California v. Greenwood, the respondent challenged the admissibility 
of evidence that the police obtained by asking the garbage collector to 
keep his garbage separate, and then seizing it to conduct a search.72 
The Supreme Court found that the police's actions did not violate the 
Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and 
seizures and noted that: 
[R]espondents placed their refuse at the curb for the express 
purpose of conveying it to a third party, the trash collector, who 
might himself have sorted through respondents' trash or 
permitted others, such as the police, to do so. Accordingly, 
having deposited their garbage "in an area particularly suited 
for public inspection and, in a manner of speaking, public 
consumption, for the express purpose of having strangers take 
it[.]73 
68. Id. ("No law of Congress can place in the hands of officials connected 
with the postal service any authority to invade the secrecy of letters and 
such sealed packages in the mail; and all regulations adopted as to mail 
matter of this kind must be in subordination to the great principle 
embodied in the fourth amendment of the Constitution."). 
69. See United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249, 252 (1970) ("[N]o law 
of Congress can place in the hands of officials connected with the postal 
service any authority to invade the secrecy of letters . . . and all 
regulations adopted as to mail matter must be in subordination to the 
great principle embodied in the fourth amendment of the 
Constitution."). 
70. Id. at 253 ("The significant Fourth Amendment interest was in the 
privacy of this first-class mail; and that privacy was not disturbed or 
invaded until the approval of the magistrate was obtained."). 
71. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 41-42 (1988) ("Our conclusion 
that society would not accept as reasonable respondents' claim to an 
expectation of privacy· in trash left for collection in an area accessible to 
the public is reinforced by the unanimous rejection of similar claims by 
the Federal Courts of Appeals."). 
72. Id. at 38. 
73. Id. at 40-41(citation omitted). 
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Thus, when an object is knowingly relinquished to a third party, 
the expectation of privacy may be negated. However, the Supreme 
Court's holding in Greenwood was in part based on the contention 
that "[i]t is common knowledge that plastic garbage bags left on or at 
the side of a public street are readily accessible to animals, children, 
scavengers, snoops, and other members of the public. "74 
2. Probable Cause 
The Fourth Amendment provides that "no warrant shall issue, 
but upon probable cause. "75 Probable cause essentially means that 
there is a "fair probability" that the specific evidence sought will be 
at the place to be searched at the time that law enforcement wishes to 
search it. 76 Probable cause has been defined as a "fluid" concept, and 
is evaluated through a totality of the circumstances test, based on a 
practical, common-sense determination.77 However, probable cause is 
not established if there is only minimal support that the evidence may 
be in that location.78 Once the magistrate determined that probable 
cause exists, he may issue the warrant as long as the other warrant 
requirements are met.79 
3. Particularity Requirement 
To fulfill the Fourth Amendment's particularity requirement, a 
warrant must "particularly" describe the place to be searched and the 
persons or things to be seized.80 The place to be searched prong 
requires that the officer conducting the search be able to identify the 
74. Id. at 40 (emphasis added). 
75. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. (regarding searches and seizures). 
76. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983) ("The task of the issuing 
magistrate is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision 
whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before 
him, including the "veracity" and "basis of knowledge" of persons 
supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that 
contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place."). 
77. Id. at 232 (probable cause turns on "the assessment of probabilities in 
particular factual contexts - not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a 
neat set of legal rules."). 
78. Id. at 239 ("Sufficient information must be presented to the magistrate 
to allow that official to determine probable cause; his action cannot be a 
mere ratification of the bare conclusions of others."). 
79. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see Gates, 462 U.S. at 239-240 (explaining that 
the totality of the circumstances test will not lessen the magistrate's 
ability to make a determination as to whether probable cause exists to 
issue a warrant). 
80. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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location he is to search with "reasonable effort. "81 The "things to be 
seized" prong requires the description be sufficient enough so that an 
officer will be able to determine which items he may seize and which 
he may not.82 This prong also requires that any item seized be within 
the scope of the probable cause.83 
However, often one or both of these prongs are lacking. The 
Supreme Court recently outlined the warrant particularity 
requirements in Groh v. Ramirez, holding that a warrant that 
described with particularity the place to be searched was invalid 
because the warrant failed to identify any of the items that the 
petitioner intended to seize.84 In Groh, the warrant's description of 
items to be seized was limited to one item: "[a] single dwelling 
residence ... blue in color. "85 The Court held that the warrant did 
not contain a description of the items to be seized "at all," and 
although there was probable cause to issue the search: warrant, the 
Court invalidated it due to the lack of particularity.86 
Thus, because it is possible to establish probable cause to search a 
location for one item, but not another,87 or that the warrant that may 
be so facially overbroad that it allows an agent to seize an entire 
house,88 agents must exercise diligence when describing the place to be 
searched or the things to be seized. Law enforcement agents must 
also take care to not to be overly broad, because courts also refuse to 
81. Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498, 503 (1925) (here, the description 
of the building as a garage and for business purposes at 611 W. 45th 
Street was a sufficient description). 
82. Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 296 (1927) (noting that nothing 
can be left to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant as to 
what is to be taken). 
83. Cf., Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 563 (2004) (noting that an officer 
executing a search warrant must ensure that the search is "lawfully 
authorized and lawfully conducted," and because there was no 
description of things to be seized, the "search was clearly 'unreasonable' 
under the Fourth Amendment."). 
84. Id. at 554-555 (emphasis added). 
85. Id. at 558. 
86. Id. at 557("The warrant was plainly invalid ... 'the warrant ... was 
deficient in particularity because it provided no description of the type 
of evidence sought."') (citation omitted). 
87. Cf., United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1276 (1999) (finding that 
the scope of the warrant had been exceeded because there was probable 
cause to search the computer for evidence of drug dealing, not the child 
pornography that the detective found). 
88. Groh, 540 U.S. at 554. 
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Thus, when an object is knowingly relinquished to a third party, 
the expectation of privacy may be negated. However, the Supreme 
Court's holding in Greenwood was in part based on the contention 
that "[i]t is common knowledge that plastic garbage bags left on or at 
the side of a public street are readily accessible to animals, children, 
scavengers, snoops, and other members of the public. "74 
2. Probable Cause 
The Fourth Amendment provides that "no warrant shall issue, 
but upon probable cause. "75 Probable cause essentially means that 
there is a "fair probability" that the specific evidence sought will be 
at the place to be searched at the time that law enforcement wishes to 
search it. 76 Probable cause has been defined as a "fluid" concept, and 
is evaluated through a totality of the circumstances test, based on a 
practical, common-sense determination.77 However, probable cause is 
not established if there is only minimal support that the evidence may 
be in that location.78 Once the magistrate determined that probable 
cause exists, he may issue the warrant as long as the other warrant 
requirements are met. 79 
3. Particularity Requirement 
To fulfill the Fourth Amendment's particularity requirement, a 
warrant must "particularly" describe the place to be searched and the 
persons or things to be seized. 80 The place to be searched prong 
requires that the officer conducting the search be able to identify the 
74. Id. at 40 (emphasis added). 
75. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. (regarding searches and seizures). 
76. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983) ("The task of the issuing 
magistrate is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision 
whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before 
him, including the "veracity" and "basis of knowledge" of persons 
supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that 
contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place."). 
77. Id. at 232 (probable cause turns on "the assessment of probabilities in 
particular factual contexts - not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a 
neat set of legal rules."). 
78. Id. at 239 ("Sufficient information must be presented to the magistrate 
to allow that official to determine probable cause; his action cannot be a 
mere ratification of the bare conclusions of others."). 
79. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see Gates, 462 U.S. at 239-240 (explaining that 
the totality of the circumstances test will not lessen the magistrate's 
ability to make a determination as to whether probable cause exists to 
issue a warrant). 
80. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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location he is to search with "reasonable effort. "81 The "things to be 
seized" prong requires the description be sufficient enough so that an 
officer will be able to determine which items he may seize and which 
he may not.82 This prong also requires that any item seized be within 
the scope of the probable cause.83 
However, often one or both of these prongs are lacking. The 
Supreme Court recently outlined the warrant particularity 
requirements in Groh v. Ramirez, holding that a warrant that 
described with particularity the place to be searched was invalid 
because the warrant failed to identify any of the items that the 
petitioner intended to seize.84 In Groh, the warrant's description of 
items to be seized was limited to one item: "[a] single dwelling 
residence . . . blue in color. "85 The Court held that the warrant did 
not contain a description of the items to be seized "at all," and 
although there was probable cause to issue the search warrant, the 
Court invalidated it due to the lack of particularity.86 
Thus, because it is possible to establish probable cause to search a 
location for one item, but not another,87 or that the warrant that may 
be so facially overbroad that it allows an agent to seize an entire 
house,88 agents must exercise diligence when describing the place to be 
searched or the things to be seized. Law enforcement agents must 
also take care to not to be overly broad, because courts also refuse to 
81. Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498, 503 (1925) (here, the description 
of the building as a garage and for business purposes at 611 W. 45th 
Street was a sufficient description). 
82. Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 296 (1927) (noting that nothing 
can be left to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant as to 
what is to be taken). 
83. Cf., Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 563 (2004) (noting that an officer 
executing a search warrant must ensure that the search is "lawfully 
authorized and lawfully conducted," and because there was no 
description of things to be seized, the "search was clearly 'unreasonable' 
under the Fourth Amendment."). 
84. Id. at 554-555 (emphasis added). 
85. Id. at 558. 
86. Id. at 557("The warrant was plainly invalid ... 'the warrant ... was 
deficient in particularity because it provided no description of the type 
of evidence sought."') (citation omitted). 
87. Cf., United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1276 (1999) (finding that 
the scope of the warrant had been exceeded because there was probable 
cause to search the computer for evidence of drug dealing, not the child 
pornography that the detective found). 
88. Groh, 540 U.S. at 554. 
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uphold "blanket warrants," which are warrants that allow for broad 
scale search and seizures, absent proof of necessity.89 
One of the main issues with computer warrants is that they often 
suffer from lack of particularity. Thus, police should diligently 
describe with particularity the specific files they seek in the warrant 
application,90 and not simply provide a generalized description of the 
physical computer itself. It is also imperative that the police strictly 
abide by the particularity requirement, instead of merely requesting 
to search every file on the computer because of the large quantity of 
information that computers are capable of holding. 91 To make the 
description as particular as possible, it should include the type of file 
or media92 , where the files may be located, and/ or a description of the 
crime itself and how the files or media sought may be related. 93 
4. Restrictions Imposed by Magistrates 
Magistrates have begun to impose restrictions on the scope of 
computer warrants in an attempt to discourage law enforcement 
agents from exceeding the scope of what they have probable cause to 
search or seize. 94 These warrant limitations include the how and when 
the agent may conduct a computer search or seizure, among other 
things. 95 As it relates to computer searches, this means that a 
89. See, e.g., United States v. Hill, 459 F.3d 966, 976 (9th Cir. 2006) ("We 
do not approve of issuing warrants authorizing blanket removal of all 
computer storage media for later examination when there is no affidavit 
giving a reasonable explanation . . . as to why a wholesale seizure is 
necessary."). 
90. See e.g., Carey, at 1275 (noting that "the magistrate should then 
require officers to specify in a warrant which types of files are sought."). 
91. See e.g., United States v. Giberson, 527 F.3d 882, 887 (9th Cir. 2008) 
("Computers, like briefcases and cassette tapes, can be repositories for 
documents and records."). 
92. For example, a computer file may be a picture or drawing in .JPG 
format, or a Microsoft Word document (.doc). 
93. See e.g., United States v. Gawrysiak, 972 F.Supp. 853, 860-61 (D. N.J. 
1997) aff'd 178 F.3d 1281 (3d Cir. 1999) (upholding the validity of a 
search warrant because it specifically limited what agents could search 
for, leaving little to their discretion). 
94. See Orin Kerr, Ex Ante Regulation of Computer Search and Seizure, 96 
VA. L. REV. 1241 (Oct. 2010) [hereinafter Ex Ante Regulation] 
(describing why magistrates should not impose restrictions on warrants); 
see contra Paul Ohm, Response, Massive Hard Drives, General 
Warrants, and the Power of Magistrate Judges, 97 VA. L. REV. IN 
BRJEF 1 (Mar. 2011) [hereinafter Ohm] (responding to Kerr's article and 
describing why magistrates should be able to impose restriction). 
95. See Ex Ante Regulation, supra note 94, at 1243-44 (describing four 
categories of how federal magistrate judges have limited computer 
searches and seizures). 
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magistrate may require that police only search for files or documents 
that have a .JPG or a .DOC extension, instead of allowing police to 
search any and all documents or folders on the system.96 
Some scholars have criticized this approach,97 yet others approve 
of the magistrates taking additional privacy safeguards.98 The 
argument against magistrate-imposed restrictions is based on the 
contention that the subsequent adversarial proceedings will play the 
same role; thus, the restrictions are unnecessary. 99 The argument 
continues that if law enforcement has established probable cause, then 
the magistrate should not be allowed to limit the search because he is 
not in the position to know enough about the case to establish 
workable restrictions. 100 
On the other hand, those who argue in favor of allowing 
magistrates to place restrictions on warrants believe that these rules 
are "designed to cure the manifest lack of probable cause and 
particularity in almost every computer case. "10l It is important to 
note that magistrates rarely impose these types of restrictions outside 
of computer cases, and they must consider these types of searches in a 
different context; "computer search warrants are the closest things to 
general warrants we have confronted in the . history of the 
Republic. "102 Allowing magistrates to place restrictions on computer 
search warrants provides two very important protections: first, it 
allows magistrates to limit searches to areas where probable cause 
exists and to protect against a lack of particularity; and second, it 
recogniZes that the particularity requirement must be read differently 
in regards to computer searches to avoid general warrants. 103 
96. 
97. 
98. 
99. 
See id. at 1255-58 (giving examples of how magistrates have limited 
computer searches in the past). 
See id. at 1247 (arguing that "ex parte" regulations are "unworkable 
and counterproductive" and that the same results can be achieved 
through legal challenges to the search). 
See Ohm, supra note 94, at 12 (disagreeing with Kerr's argument 
against ex ante regulations, and noting that "[i]f the Fourth Amendment 
imposes new restrictions on what law enforcement agents can do, those 
agents will, as they have so many times before, find a way to conti~ue 
to do their jobs efficiently and successfully while at the same time 
respecting the rights of the people."). 
See Ex Ante Regulation, supra note 94, at 1293. 
100. See id. at 1282 ("a magistrate judge cannot get a sense of the exigencies 
that will unfold at each stage of the search process."). 
101. See Ohm, supra note 94, at 4. 
102. See id. at 11. 
103. See id. at 10. 
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uphold "blanket warrants," which are warrants that allow for broad 
scale search and seizures, absent proof of necessity.89 
One of the main issues with computer warrants is that they often 
suffer from lack of particularity. Thus, police should diligently 
describe with particularity the specific files they seek in the warrant 
application,90 and not simply provide a generalized description of the 
physical computer itself. It is also imperative that the police strictly 
abide by the particularity requirement, instead of merely requesting 
to search every file on the computer because of the large quantity of 
information that computers are capable of holding. 91 To make the 
description as particular as possible, it should include the type of file 
or media92 , where the files may be located, and/or a description of the 
crime itself and how the files or media sought may be related. 93 
4. Restrictions Imposed by Magistrates 
Magistrates have begun to impose restrictions on the scope of 
computer warrants in an attempt to discourage law enforcement 
agents from exceeding the scope of what they have probable cause to 
search or seize. 94 These warrant limitations include the how and when 
the agent may conduct a computer search or seizure, among other 
things. 95 As it relates to computer searches, this means that a 
89. See, e.g., United States v. Hill, 459 F.3d 966, 976 (9th Cir. 2006) ("We 
do not approve of issuing warrants authorizing blanket removal of all 
computer storage media for later examination when there is no affidavit 
giving a reasonable explanation . . . as to why a wholesale seizure is 
necessary."). 
90. See e.g., Carey, at 1275 (noting that "the magistrate should then 
require officers to specify in a warrant which types of files are sought."). 
91. See e.g., United States v. Giberson, 527 F.3d 882, 887 (9th Cir. 2008) 
("Computers, like briefcases and cassette tapes, can be repositories for 
documents and records."). 
92. For example, a computer file may be a picture or drawing in .JPG 
format, or a Microsoft Word document (.doc). 
93. See e.g., United States v. Gawrysiak, 972 F.Supp. 853, 860-61 (D. N.J. 
1997) aff'd l 78 F.3d 1281 (3d Cir. 1999) (upholding the validity of a 
search warrant because it specifically limited what agents could search 
for, leaving little to their discretion). 
94. See Orin Kerr, Ex Ante Regulation of Computer Search and Seizure, 96 
VA. L. REV. 1241 (Oct. 2010) [hereinafter Ex Ante Regulation] 
(describing why magistrates should not impose restrictions on warrants); 
see contra Paul Ohm, Response, Massive Hard Drives, General 
Warrants, and the Power of Magistrate Judges, 97 VA. L. REV. IN 
BRJEF 1 (Mar. 2011) [hereinafter Ohm] (responding to Kerr's article and 
describing why magistrates should be able to impose restriction). 
95. See Ex Ante Regulation, supra note 94, at 1243-44 (describing four 
categories of how federal magistrate judges have limited computer 
searches and seizures). 
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magistrate may require that police only search for files or documents 
that have a .JPG or a .DOC extension, instead of allowing police to 
search any and all documents or folders on the system.96 
Some scholars have criticized this approach, 97 yet others approve 
of the magistrates taking additional privacy safeguards.98 The 
argument against magistrate-imposed restrictions is based on the 
contention that the subsequent adversarial proceedings will play the 
same role; thus, the restrictions are unnecessary. 99 The argument 
continues that if law enforcement has established probable cause, then 
the magistrate should not be allowed to limit the search because he is 
not in the position to know enough about the case to establish 
workable restrictions. 100 
On the other hand, those who argue in favor of allowing 
magistrates to place restrictions on warrants believe that these rules 
are "designed to cure the manifest lack of probable cause and 
particularity in almost every computer case. "101 It is important to 
note that magistrates rarely impose these types of restrictions outside 
of computer cases, and they must consider these types of searches in a 
different context; "computer search warrants are the closest things to 
general warrants we have confronted in the . history of the 
Republic. "102 Allowing magistrates to place restrictions on computer 
search warrants provides two very important protections: first, it 
allows magistrates to limit searches to areas where probable cause 
exists and to protect against a lack of particularity; and second, it 
recogniZes that the particularity requirement must be read differently 
in regards to computer searches to avoid general warrants. 103 
96. See id. at 1255-58 (giving examples of how magistrates have limited 
computer searches in the past). 
97. See id. at 1247 (arguing that "ex parte" regulations are "unworkable 
and counterproductive" and that the same results can be achieved 
through legal challenges to the search). 
98. See Ohm, supra note 94, at 12 (disagreeing with Kerr's argument 
against ex ante regulations, and noting that "[i]f the Fourth Amendment 
imposes new restrictions on what law enforcement agents can do, those 
agents will, as they have so many times before, find a way to continue 
to do their jobs efficiently and successfully while at the same time 
respecting the rights of the people."). 
99. See Ex Ante Regulation, supra note 94, at 1293. 
100. See id. at 1282 ("a magistrate judge cannot get a sense of the exigencies 
that will unfold at each stage of the search process."). 
101. See Ohm, supra note 94, at 4. 
102. See id. at 11. 
103. See id. at 10. 
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B. Warrant Exceptions 
The third party doctrine and consent searches deal with the same 
concept: a user forgoes his expectation of privacy when he purposely 
places something in the hands of another. These are arguably very 
persuasive reasons why the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement 
is already negated in regards to the cloud network. However, 
distinctive differences exist in the way that the cloud works that 
renders these doctrines inapplicable and shows the Fourth 
Amendment's protections still apply to the cloud because a user 
maintains his expectation of privacy. 
1. Third Party Doctrine 
The basis of the third party doctrine is found in the 1966 
Supreme Court decision Hoffa v. United States. 104 The Court held 
that: 
What the Fourth Amendment protects is the security a man relies 
upon when he places himself or his property within a constitutionally 
protected area, be it his home or his office, his hotel room or his 
automobile. There he is protected from unwarranted governmental 
intrusion. And when he puts something in his filing cabinet, in his 
desk drawer, or in his pocket, he has the right to know it will be 
secure from an unreasonable search or an unreasonable seizure.105 
However, Hoffa involved the admissibility of incriminating 
statements that the defendant, Hoffa, made to the third-party 
government agent who was in the hotel room. 106 The Court based its 
finding that Hoffa did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
his incriminating statements because Hoffa voluntarily disclosed the 
information to the third party, who he had trusted. 107 
It was obvious that the petitioner was not relying on the security 
of his hotel suite when he made the incriminating statements to [the 
third party] or in [his] presence. [The third party] did not enter the 
suite by force or by stealth. He was not a surreptitious eavesdropper. 
[The third party] was in the suite by invitation, and every 
conversation which he heard was either directed to him or knowingly 
carried out in his presence. 108 
. This reasoning became the basis of the third party doctrine, 
which holds that when an individual voluntarily places information in 
104. 385 U.S. 293 (1966). 
105. Id. at 301. 
106. Id. at 302. 
107. Id. ("the petitioner, in a word, was not relying on the security of the 
hotel room; he was relying upon his misplaced confidence that [the third 
party] would not reveal his wrongdoing."). 
108. Id. 
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the hands of a third party, he loses his expectation of privacy in the 
. £ t· 109 A m orma 10n. n actor assumes the risk that a third party, such as 
the person at the receiving end of the communication, will report the 
contents of the communication to the police.11° At this point, the 
conversation no longer holds Fourth Amendment protections because 
the actor has foregone his reasonable expectation of privacy. 111 
The third party doctrine is problematic for the technological 
world. 112 Use of the cloud network potentially invokes this doctrine 
since users voluntarily place their files in the hands of a third-party 
service provider. 113 Therefore, the argument can be made that when a 
person voluntarily turns files over to a third-party cloud provider by 
utilizing their services, the government may obtain the files or media 
held by the third party without a warrant.114 However, this argument 
is contingent upon the assumption that there is no expectation of 
privacy in the cloud, and that a cloud network provider is the type of 
third party that the Hoffa Court envisioned. 
2. Consent Searches 
When the police do not have a valid warrant, and may not be 
able to easily obtain one, they sometimes attempt to engage in a 
consent search.115 Law enforcement engages in a consent search when 
they gain voluntary permission from either the person who has 
109. Id. at 303 (holding that no Fourth Amendment rights were violated in 
the case). 
110. Id. ("The risk of being overheard by an eavesdropper or betrayed by an 
informer or deceived as to the identity of one with whom one deals is 
probably inherent in the conditions of human society."). 
111. Id. 
112. SOLOVE, supra note 53, at 102-110 (describing how the third party 
doctrine has developed in regards to technology). 
113. SOLOVE, supra note 53, at 105-106 (describing how the cloud potentially 
invokes the third party doctrine, which removes the Fourth 
Amendment's protections from the cloud). 
114. See David A. Couillard, Defogging the Cloud: Applying the Fourth 
Amendment Principles to Evolving Privacy Expectations in Cloud 
Computing, 93 MINN. L. REV. 2205, 2213-16 (June 2009) (explaining how 
the third party doctrine can be applied to cloud computing); see also 
SOLOVE, supra note 53, at 106 ("Since people's documents are no longer 
stored on their home computerl'; but reside instead with third parties, 
the shift to cloud computing will effectively remove Fourth Amendment 
protection from their documents."). 
115. See e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973) ("In 
situations where the police have some evidence of illicit activity, but 
lack probable cause to arrest or search, a search authorized by a valid 
consent may be the only means of obtaining important and reliable 
evidence."). 
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The third party doctrine and consent searches deal with the same 
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places ~omething in the hands of another. These are arguably very 
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Supreme Court decision Hoffa v. United States. 104 The Court held 
that: 
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upon when he places himself or his property within a constitutionally 
protected area, be it his home or his office, his hotel room or his 
automobile. There he is protected from unwarranted governmental 
intrusion. And when he puts something in his filing cabinet, in his 
desk drawer, or in his pocket, he has the right to know it will be 
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107. Id. ("the petitioner, in a word, was not relying on the security of the 
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party] would not reveal his wrongdoing."). 
108. Id. 
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the hands of a third party, he loses his expectation of privacy in the 
information.109 An actor assumes the risk that a third party, such as 
the person at the receiving end of the communication, will report the 
contents of the communication to the police. no At this point, the 
conversation no longer holds Fourth Amendment protections because 
the actor has foregone his reasonable expectation of privacy. 111 
The third party doctrine is problematic for the technological 
world.112 Use of the cloud network potentially invokes this doctrine 
since users voluntarily place their files in the hands of a third-party 
service provider. n 3 Therefore, the argument can be made that when a 
person voluntarily turns files over to a third-party cloud provider by 
utilizing their services, the government may obtain the files or media 
held by the third party without a warrant.114 However, this argument 
is contingent upon the assumption that there is no expectation of 
privacy in the cloud, and that a cloud network provider is the type of 
third party that the Hoffa Court envisioned. 
2. Consent Searches 
When the police do not have a valid warrant, and may not be 
able to easily obtain one, they sometimes attempt to engage in a 
consent search.115 Law enforcement engages in a consent search when 
they gain voluntary permission from either the person who has 
109. Id. at 303 (holding that no Fourth Amendment rights were violated in 
the case). 
110. Id. ("The risk of being overheard by an eavesdropper or betrayed by an 
informer or deceived as to the identity of one with whom one deals is 
probably inherent in the conditions of human society."). 
111. Id. 
112. SOLOVE, supra note 53, at 102-110 (describing how the third party 
doctrine has developed in regards to technology). 
113. SOLOVE, supra note 53, at 105-106 (describing how the cloud potentially 
invokes the third party doctrine, which removes the Fourth 
Amendment's protections from the cloud). 
114. See David A. Couillard, Defogging the Cloud: Applying the Fourth 
Amendment Principles to Evolving Privacy Expectations in Cloud 
Computing, 93 MINN. L. REV. 2205, 2213-16 (June 2009) (explaining how 
the third party doctrine can be applied to cloud computing); see also 
SOLOVE, supra note 53, at 106 ("Since people's documents are no longer 
stored on their home computerE; but reside instead with third parties, 
the shift to cloud computing will effectively remove Fourth Amendment 
protection from their documents."). 
115. See e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973) ("In 
situations where the police have some evidence of illicit activity, but 
lack probable cause to arrest or search, a search authorized by a valid 
consent may be the only means of obtaining important and reliable 
evidence."). 
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authority,116 or one who has "joint occupancy,"117 in order to conduct 
the search. This determination is based on the surrounding 
circumstances.118 Once consent is granted, the Fourth Amendment's 
warrant requirement is considered waived. 119 
As mentioned briefly above, third parties may grant consent when 
they have "joint access or authority" in a particular area that the 
police wish to search. 120 In Illinois v. Rodriguez, the Supreme Court 
held that consent to search was valid when given by somebody who 
the police reasonably believed had the authority to grant the 
consent. 121 For example, the police relied on the fact that the woman 
who gave consent to search an apartment had keys to the area, stored 
clothing and furniture there, and called it "our" apartment.122 
However, it is important to remember that when someone giving 
consent clearly does not have the authority to do so, consent is 
invalidated because the police should not have reasonably relied on 
the consent. 123 
C. Physical Computer Searches - Counteracting Overly Broad 
Warrants 
Typically, so long as the warrant complies with Fourth 
Amendment requirements, no issues arise when the police obtain a 
warrant and conduct a search of a computer's physical hard drive.124 
116. Id. at 248-49. 
117. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 169 (1974) ("It has been 
assumed by the parties and the courts below that the voluntary consent 
of any joint occupant of a residence to search the premises jointly 
occupied is valid against the co-occupant[.]"). 
118. Bustamante, 412 U.S. at 248-49 ("Voluntariness is a question of fact to 
be determined from all the circumstances[.]"). 
119. Id. at 221 (noting that the appellate court found that a consent search 
was "a waiver of a constitutional right," thus a showing of voluntariness 
needed to be established). 
120. Matlock, 415 U.S. at 169. 
121. 497 U.S. 177, 188-189 (1990) ("[D]etermination of consent to enter must 
'be judged against an objective standard: would the facts available to 
the officer at the moment . . . [warrant a beliefj' that the consenting 
party had authority over the premises ... if so, then the search is valid.") 
(citation omitted). 
122. Id. at 179. 
123. Id. at 186 (describing how the officer's reliance on the consent to search 
must be reasonable). 
124. See Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 557 (2004) (explaining that a 
warrant needs to comply with the Fourth Amendment's four 
proscriptions: probable cause, supported by sworn affidavit, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched and the type of evidence 
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Challenges arise when a defendant later alleges that the police 
exceeded the scope of the warrant. 125 For example, police may 
purposely search for evidence outside the warrant's scope,126 or when 
they purposely seize more files or data than they actually need.127 
However, it is clear that when the warrant is limited to the 
computer's physical hard drive, the search ends there; law 
enforcement may not use an otherwise valid warrant to access the 
user's cloud account. 
Currently, police conduct searches of the files and documents 
contained on a computer in one of two ways. First, pursuant to the 
warrant, the police enter the location and seize the computer.128 The 
police retain control of the computer while searching the hard drive in 
a controlled environment, a process that may take anywhere from 
days to months.129 Alternatively, an agent makes an exact, read-only 
image of the hard drive as it is at the moment of the search.130 The 
sought, and that a warrant that fails to comply with these requirements 
is invalid). 
125. See Thomas K. Clancy, The Fourth Amendment Aspects of Computer 
Searches and Seizures: A Perspective and a Primer, 75 MISS. L.J. 193, 
197-216 (2005) [hereinafter Clancy] (explaining the various search 
methodologies and the issues with each of them). 
126. See United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1270, 1273-74 (10th Cir. 
1999) (explaining that a warrant to search the defendant's computer for 
"names, telephone numbers, ledger receipts, addresses, and other 
documentary evidence pertaining to the sale and distribution of 
controlled substances," constrained the search to only those items listed 
and noting that the officer in question knew that he was exceeding the 
scope of the warrant. Thus, the subsequently seized evidence was 
inadmissible.). 
127. See United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 621 F.3d 1162, 
1173 (9th Cir. 2010) (en bane) (holding that when the government 
purposefully exceeded the scope of the warrant and seized more 
information than it was allowed, it needed to return the property it 
obtained through its intentional wrongdoing). 
128. See United States v. Hill, 459 F.3d 966, 974-75 (9th Cir. 2006) 
(specifying reasons to seize the computer in its entirety in lieu of 
bringing a laptop to the scene to sort through the material, even though 
that meant non-seizable material would be taken as well. These included 
the risk that the police. may damage the storage medium or compromise 
the evidence, and that the process of searching on-site might take a long 
time.). 
129. See, e.g., id. at 975-75 (explaining why the seizure of a computer and 
the subsequent search back at the police station was not unreasonable). 
130. See Orin Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. 
REV. 531, 540 (2005) [hereinafter Searches and Seizures] ("To ensure the 
evidentiary integrity of the original evidence, the computer forensics 
process always begins with the creation of perfect 'bitstream' copy or 
'image' of the original storage device saved as a 'read only' file. All 
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authority, 116 or one who has "joint occupancy, "117 in order to conduct 
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warrant requirement is considered waived. 119 
As mentioned briefly above, third parties may grant consent when 
they have "joint access or authority" in a particular area that the 
police wish to search. 120 In Illinois v. Rodriguez, the Supreme Court 
held that consent to search was valid when given by somebody who 
the police reasonably believed had the authority to grant the 
consent. 121 For example, the police relied on the fact that the woman 
who gave consent to search an apartment had keys to the area, stored 
clothing and furniture there, and called it "our" apartment.122 
However, it is important to remember that when someone giving 
consent clearly does not have the authority to do so, consent is 
invalidated because the police should not have reasonably relied on 
the consent. 123 
C. Physical Computer Searches - Counteracting Overly Broad 
Warrants 
Typically, so long as the warrant complies with Fourth 
Amendment requirements, no issues arise when the police obtain a 
warrant and conduct a search of a computer's physical hard drive.124 
116. Id. at 248-49. 
117. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 169 (1974) ("It has been 
assumed by the parties and the courts below that the voluntary consent 
of any joint occupant of a residence to search the premises jointly 
occupied is valid against the co-occupant[.]"). 
118. Bustamante, 412 U.S. at 248-49 ("Voluntariness is a question of fact to 
be determined from all the circumstances[.]"). 
119. Id. at 221 (noting that the appellate court found that a consent search 
was "a waiver of a constitutional right," thus a showing of voluntariness 
needed to be established). 
120. Matlock, 415 U.S. at 169. 
121. 497 U.S. 177, 188-189 (1990) ("[D]etermination of consent to enter must 
'be judged against an objective standard: would the facts available to 
the officer at the moment . . . [warrant a beliefj' that the consenting 
party had authority over the premises ... if so, then the search is valid.") 
(citation omitted). 
122. Id. at 179. 
123. Id. at 186 (describing how the officer's reliance on the consent to search 
must be reasonable). 
124. See Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 557 (2004) (explaining that a 
warrant needs to comply with the Fourth Amendment's four 
proscriptions: probable cause, supported by sworn affidavit, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched and the type of evidence 
188 
JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY& THE INTERNET· VOL. 4 ·No. l · 2012 
Searching the Clouds 
Challenges arise when a defendant later alleges that the police 
exceeded the scope of the warrant. 125 For example, police may 
purposely search for evidence outside the warrant's scope,126 or when 
they purposely seize more files or data than they actually need.127 
However, it is clear that when the warrant is limited to the 
computer's physical hard drive, the search ends there; law 
enforcement may not use an otherwise valid warrant to access the 
user's cloud account. 
Currently, police conduct searches of the files and documents 
contained on a computer in one of two ways. First, pursuant to the 
warrant, the police enter the location and seize the computer. 128 The 
police retain control of the computer while searching the hard drive in 
a controlled environment, a process that may take anywhere from 
days to months. 129 Alternatively, an agent makes an exact, read-only 
image of the hard drive as it is at the moment of the search.130 The 
sought, and that a warrant that fails to comply with these requirements 
is invalid). 
125. See Thomas K. Clancy, The Fourth Amendment Aspects of Computer 
Searches and Seizures: A Perspective and a Primer, 75 MISS. L.J. 193, 
197-216 (2005) [hereinafter Clancy] (explaining the various search 
methodologies and the issues with each of them). 
126. See United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1270, 1273-74 (10th Cir. 
1999) (explaining that a warrant to search the defendant's computer for 
"names, telephone numbers, ledger receipts, addresses, and other 
documentary evidence pertaining to the sale and distribution of 
controlled substances," constrained the search to only those items listed 
and noting that the officer in question knew that he was exceeding the 
scope of the warrant. Thus, the subsequently seized evidence was 
inadmissible.). 
127. See United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 621 F.3d 1162, 
1173 (9th Cir. 2010) (en bane) (holding that when the government 
purposefully exceeded the scope of the warrant and seized more 
information than it was allowed, it needed to return the property it 
obtained through its intentional wrongdoing). 
128. See United States v. Hill, 459 F.3d 966, 974-75 (9th Cir. 2006) 
(specifying reasons to seize the computer in its entirety in lieu of 
bringing a laptop to the scene to sort through the material, even though 
that meant non-seizable material would be taken as well. These included 
the risk that the police. may damage the storage medium or compromise 
the evidence, and that the process of searching on-site might take a long 
time.). 
129. See, e.g., id. at 975-75 (explaining why the seizure of a computer and 
the subsequent search back at the police station was not unreasonable). 
130. See Orin Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. 
REV. 531, 540 (2005) [hereinafter Searches and Seizures] ("To ensure the 
evidentiary integrity of the original evidence, the computer forensics 
process always begins with the creation of perfect 'bitstream' copy or 
'image' of the original storagE'. device saved as a 'read only' file. All 
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agent takes the copy, rather than the actual physical computer, back 
to the lab where other officers search the read-only images at their 
1 · 131 B h . e1sure. ecause t e copy is read-only, the subsequent search will 
not alter the copy. 132 The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure allows 
for either approach. 133 
Courts have demonstrated they are unwilling to apply the "one 
warrant fits all" approach to electronic file seizure. In United States 
v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, when government agents seized all 
the drug testing records located at Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc. 
because it was "too hard" to distinguish the ten accounts they sought 
from the hundreds that were intertwined on a single excel 
spreadsheet, the Ninth Circuit required the evidence be returned.134 
The Ninth Circuit, en bane, recognized that an officer must take extra 
steps to protect the privacy of those who are subjected to an overly-
broad warrant, 135 and noted "[t]he pressing need of law enforcement 
for broad authorization to examine electronic records . . . creates a 
serious risk that every warrant for electronic information will become 
in effect, a general warrant, rendering the Fourth Amendment 
irrelevant. "136 
These extra steps are required because the court specifically 
acknowledged that situations exist where broad-scale seizure may be 
the only feasible way to efficiently conduct the search.137 The 
enforcement of these additional requirements addresses instances 
when it is especially apparent that it is "an obvious case of deliberate 
overreaching by the government in an effort to seize data as to which 
it lacked probable cause. "138 
To counter the issue of overbroad searches and lack of clear 
guidelines, the law has begun analogizing computer hard drive 
analysis is performed on the bitstream copy instead of the original. The 
actual search occurs on the government's computer, not the 
defendant's."). 
131. See id. at 540-41. 
132. Id. at 541. 
133. F. R. CRJM. P. 41(f)(l)(B) ("[I]n a case involving the seizure of 
~lectroni? storage media or the seizure or copying of electronically stored 
mformat10n[.]") (emphasis added). 
134. 621 F.3d 1162, 1169 (9th Cir. 2010) (en bane). 
135. Id. a~ 1177 (explaining that judicial officers must be vigilant in "striking 
the nght balance between the government's interest in law enforcement 
and the right of individuals to be free from unreasonable searches and 
seizures"). 
136. Id. at 1176. 
137. Id. at 1169. 
138. Id. at 1172. 
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searches to different physical search methodologies. The government 
has recognized the need for limiting electronic searches, and has, in 
fact, codified that comparable searches must be limited.139 For 
example, the procedure for interception of wire, oral, or electronic 
communications states "[e]very order and extension ... shall be 
conducted in such a way as to minimize the interception of 
communications not otherwise subject to interception under this 
chapter, and must terminate upon attainment of the authorized 
objective. "140 It is important to gain a basic understanding of these 
analogies in order to understand why none encompass the cloud, 
which explains why law enforcement needs a separate warrant to 
search the cloud network. 
1. The "Container" Search Analogy 
Likely due to the ease of comparison, hard drive searches are most 
commonly compared to "container" searches.141 The container search 
analogy is based on the Supreme Court's holding that an officer's 
warrantless search of personal containers violates the owner's 
reasonable expectation of privacy.142 However, when the police have a 
valid warrant, they are able to search any container that may contain 
the item described in the warrant. 143 Because the courts have 
analogized computers to be the "functional equivalent" of containers, 
the police may search a · computer because items specified on the 
warrant might be contained therein. 144 
Scholars and courts alike have criticized applying the container 
analogy to computer searches because it is overly broad and 
essentially provides a "blank check" to the officer by giving him 
access to every file on the computer. 145 It is argued that police should 
139. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (2006) (describing how "[n]o order entered under 
this section [of the law] may authorize or approve the interception ~f 
any wire, oral, or electronic communication for any period longer than is 
necessary to achieve the objective of the authorization"). 
140. § 2518(5). 
141. Office of Legal Educ. & Exec. Office for United States Attorneys, 
Searching and Seizing Computers and Obtaining Electronic Evidence in 
Criminal Investigations, 2-3 (2009), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/cybercrime/docs/ssmanual2009.p~ 
("To determine whether an individual has a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in information stored in a computer, it helps to treat the 
computer like a closed container such as a briefcase or file cabinet."); 
see also Searches and Seizures, supra note 130 at 550. 
142. See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 822-23 (1982). 
143. See Clancy, supra note 125, at 198-99. 
144. Id. at 199 ("computers have been said to be [like containers]"). 
145. Id. at 203-204; see also United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268 (10th Cir. 
1999). 
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in effect, a general warrant, rendering the Fourth Amendment 
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when it is especially apparent that it is "an obvious case of deliberate 
overreaching by the government in an effort to seize data as to which 
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~lectrom~ storage media or the seizure or copying of electronically stored 
mformation[.]") (emphasis added). 
134. 621 F.3d 1162, 1169 (9th Cir. 2010) (en bane). 
135. Id. a~ 1177 (explaining that judicial officers must be vigilant in "striking 
the nght balance between the government's interest in law enforcement 
and the right of individuals to be free from unreasonable searches and 
seizures"). 
136. Id. at 1176. 
137. Id. at 1169. 
138. Id. at 1172. 
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searches to different physical search methodologies. The government 
has recognized the need for limiting electronic searches, and has, in 
fact, codified that comparable searches must be limited.139 For 
example, the procedure for interception of wire, oral, or electronic 
communications states "[e]very order and extension ... shall be 
conducted in such a way as to minimize the interception of 
communications not otherwise subject to interception under this 
chapter, and must terminate upon attainment of the authorized 
objective. "140 It is important to gain a basic understanding of these 
analogies in order to understand why none encompass the cloud, 
which explains why law enforcement needs a separate warrant to 
search the cloud network. 
1. The "Container" Search Analogy 
Likely due to the ease of comparison, hard drive searches are most 
commonly compared to "container" searches.141 The container search 
analogy is based on the Supreme Court's holding that an officer's 
warrantless search of personal containers violates the owner's 
reasonable expectation of privacy.142 However, when the police have a 
valid warrant, they are able to search any container that may contain 
the item described in the warrant. 143 Because the courts have 
analogized computers to be the "functional equivalent" of containers, 
the police may search a · computer because items specified on the 
warrant might be contained therein.144 
Scholars and courts alike have criticized applying the container 
analogy to computer searches because it is overly broad and 
essentially provides a "blank check" to the officer by giving him 
access to every file on the computer .145 It is argued that police should 
139. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (2006) (describing how "[n]o order entered under 
this section [of the law] may authorize or approve the interception ~f 
any wire, oral, or electronic communication for any period longer than is 
necessary to achieve the objective of the authorization"). 
140. § 2518(5). 
141. Office of Legal Educ. & Exec. Office for United States Attorneys, 
Searching and Seizing Computers and Obtaining Electronic Evidence in 
Criminal Investigations, 2-3 (2009), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/cybercrime/docs/ssmanual2009.p~ 
("To determine whether an individual has a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in information stored in a computer, it helps to treat the 
computer like a closed container such as a briefcase or file cabinet."); 
see also Searches and Seizures, supra note 130 at 550. 
142. See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 822-23 (1982). 
143. See Clancy, supra note 125, at 198-99. 
144. Id. at 199 ("computers have been said to be [like containers]"). 
145. Id. at 203-204; see also United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268 (10th Cir. 
1999). 
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be required to utilize restrictive measures in order to protect the 
privacy of the user .146 The next two search methodologies are ways to 
limit the container search analogy. 
2. The "Sub-Container" Search Analogy 
Arguably, a warrant may constitute permission to search the 
entire computer container without limitations; thus it may be 
necessary to place further limitations on a computer container 
search.147 Applying a "sub-container" analogy provides some added 
protections. Under this view, the computer is still viewed as one big 
container or "physical shell, "148 but each directory or file is an even 
smaller ·unit, a "sub-container. "149 This view dictates that each sub-
folder saved on the physical hard drive of the computer, e.g., a 
document, spreadsheet, or file, requires an individual search warrant. 
150 
However, the sub-c.ontainer theory has been criticized as an 
unworkable standard. 151 "Storage media do[es] not naturally divide 
into parts. Subdivisions must be invented, and every subdivision 
strategy comes with flaws. "152 This theory is difficult to apply. 153 
Law enforcement has no consistent standard to determine what might 
be considered a "sub-container. "154 Some courts may view each 
individual file on a computer as a sub-container; however, other 
courts may find that the individuals lines within an excel spreadsheet, 
a single file, are sub-containers.155 As "defining subcontainers defines 
146. Clancy, supra note 125 at 203-204 (rejecting the container approach). 
147. See Josh Goldfoot, The Physical Computer and the Fourth Amendment, 
16 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 112, 112 [hereinafter Goldfoot] ("Computer 
storage media can reveal facts relevant to an investigation, but they can 
also reveal irrelevant facts that can be embarrassing or inform 
investigators for the first time about a new crime."). 
148. Id. at 118. 
149. Id. at 112-13, 119. 
150. Id. at 119-120. 
151. Id. at 131-32 (discussing the issues applying the sub-container view to 
computer searches). 
152. Id. at 131. 
153. Id. at 125-30 (describing a few of the many issues that the subcontainer 
view brings with it). 
154. Id. at 125 ("From the subcontainer perspective, this question becomes: 
what are the subcontainers?"). 
155. See United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 621 F.3d 1162, 
1181 (9th Cir. 2010) (en bane) (J., Kozinski, concurring) (implicitly 
applying the subcontainer view when noting law enforcement could have 
"could have selected the spreadsheet rows for the ten ballplayers for 
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what information is immune from seizure,"156 the officers must be 
careful to specifically particularize the warrant to their search and to 
perhaps conduct a very narrow search to not miss a necessary sub-
container. However, the ease of mobility of information on a 
computer dictates that this might not be the easiest thing to do. 
3. The "Special" Approach Theory Analogy 
As a third alternative, courts may utilize the "special" approach 
theory of computer searches, which is similar to the sub-container 
approach. For example, a magistrate utilizes the special approach in 
limiting the warrant by seeking a description or an example of the 
evidence sought by law enforcement before authorizing a broad 
search, and allowing the search to encompass only specific search 
terms that may relate to . the items sought. 157 When utilizing this 
method, the court requires the warrant to "include measures to direct 
the subsequent search of the computer. "158 
Courts have considered the special approach. 159 For example, in 
United State~ v. Carey, the police seized two computers and obtained 
a search warrant to search for evidence related to drugs. 160 After 
conducting the search, the detective stumbled upon evidence of child 
pornography when he opened a file containing such pornography and 
continued to purposefully open subsequent files that he knew were not 
related to drugs. 161 .The court rejected the government's attempted 
justification of the search through its proposed file cabinet 
argument, 162 and found that the detective had purposely exceeded the 
156. 
157. 
158. 
159. 
160. 
whom he had a warrant, then copied and pasted those rows into a blank 
spreadsheet. If he had done so, he would have seen only those drug 
testing results for which he had a warrant."). 
Goldfoot, supra note 147, at 125. 
See Clancy, supra note 125, · at 199-200 (criticizing the "special" 
approach as unworkable in light of the reality of the ease in which one 
may manipulate computer files); but see United States v. Carey, 172 
F.3d 1268 (10th Cir. 1999) (utilizing the "special" approach and 
suppressing the evidence found when an officer opened .JPG files, which 
were not included in the warrant). 
See In re Search of 3817 W. West End, 321 F. Supp. 2d 953, 955 (N.D. 
Ill. 2004) (expressing concern over the government's intention to review 
all files contained on a computer to determine their evidentiary nature, 
and requiring the government to provide a detailed protocol outlining 
the way the search would be limited). 
See, e.g., United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1275 (10th Cir. 1999) 
(acknowledging that computers often contain intermingled documents). 
Id. at 1270. 
161. Id. at 1271. 
162. Id. at 1272 (rejecting the government's argument that because they had 
a warrant to search the computer, they could search the computer for 
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be required to utilize restrictive measures in order to protect the 
privacy of the user .146 The next two search methodologies are ways to 
limit the container search analogy. 
2. The "Sub-Container" Search Analogy 
Arguably, a warrant may constitute permission: to search the 
entire computer container without limitations; thus it may be 
necessary to place further limitations on a computer container 
search.147 Applying a "sub-container" analogy provides some added 
protections. Under this view, the computer is still viewed as one big 
container or "physical shell, "148 but each directory or file is an even 
smaller ·unit, a "sub-container. "149 This view dictates that each sub-
folder saved on the physical hard drive of the computer, e.g., a 
document, spreadsheet, or file, requires an individual search warrant. 
150 
However, the sub-c.ontainer theory has been criticized as an 
unworkable standard.151 "Storage media do[es] not naturally divide 
into parts. Subdivisions must be invented, and every subdivision 
strategy comes with flaws. "152 This theory is difficult to apply. 153 
Law enforcement has no consistent standard to determine what might 
be considered a "sub-container."154 Some courts may view each 
individual file on a computer as a sub-container; however, other 
courts may find that the individuals lines within an excel spreadsheet, 
a single file, are sub-containers.155 As "defining subcontainers defines 
146. Clancy, supra note 125 at 203-204 (rejecting the container approach). 
147. See Josh Goldfoot, The Physical Computer and the Fourth Amendment, 
16 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 112, 112 [hereinafter Goldfoot] ("Computer 
storage media can reveal facts relevant to an investigation, but they can 
also reveal irrelevant facts that can be embarrassing or inform 
investigators for the first time about a new crime."). 
148. Id. at 118. 
149. Id. at 112-13, 119. 
150. Id. at 119-120. 
151. Id. at 131-32 (discussing the issues applying the sub-container view to 
computer searches). 
152. Id. at 131. 
153. Id. at 125-30 (describing a few of the many issues that the subcontainer 
view brings with it). 
154. Id. at 125 ("From the subcontainer perspective, this question becomes: 
what are the subcontainers?"). 
155. See United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 621 F.3d 1162, 
1181 (9th Cir. 2010) (en bane) (J., Kozinski, concurring) (implicitly 
applying the subcontainer view when noting law enforcement could have 
"could have selected the spreadsheet rows for the ten ballplayers for 
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what information is immune from seizure, "156 the officers must be 
careful to specifically particularize the warrant to their search and to 
perhaps conduct a very narrow search to not miss a necessary sub-
container. However, the ease of mobility of information on a 
computer dictates that this might not be the easiest thing to do. 
3. The "Special" Approach Theory Analogy 
As a third alternative, courts may utilize the "special" approach 
theory of computer searches, which is similar to the sub-container 
approach. For example, a magistrate utilizes the special approach in 
limiting the warrant by seeking a description or an example of the 
evidence sought by law enforcement before authorizing a broad 
search, and allowing the search to encompass only specific search 
terms that may relate to the items sought. 157 When utilizing this 
method, the court requires the warrant to "include measures to direct 
the subsequent search of the computer. "158 
Courts have considered the special approach. 159 For example, in 
United States v. Carey, the police seized two computers and obtained 
a search warrant to search for evidence related to drugs.160 After 
conducting the search, the detective stumbled upon evidence of child 
pornography when he opened a file containing such pornography and 
continued to purposefully open subsequent files that he knew were not 
related to drugs. 161 The court rejected the government's attempted 
justification of the search through its proposed file cabinet 
argument,162 and found that the detective had purposely exceeded the 
whom he had a warrant, then copied and pasted those rows into a blank 
spreadsheet. If he had done so, he would have seen only those drug 
testing results for which he had a warrant."). 
156. Goldfoot, supra note 147, at 125. 
157. See Clancy, supra note 125, · at 199-200 (criticizing the "special" 
approach as unworkable in light of the reality of the ease in which one 
may manipulate computer files); but see United States v. Carey, 172 
F.3d 1268 (10th Cir. 1999) (utilizing the "special" approach and 
suppressing the evidence found when an officer opened .JPG files, which 
were not included in the warrant). 
158. See In re Search of 3817 W. West End, 321 F. Supp. 2d 953, 955 (N.D. 
Ill. 2004) (expressing concern over the government's intention to review 
all files contained on a computer to determine their evidentiary nature, 
and requiring the government to provide a detailed protocol outlining 
the way the search would be limited). 
159. See, e.g., United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1275 (10th Cir. 1999) 
(acknowledging that computers often contain intermingled documents). 
160. Id. at 1270. 
161. Id. at 1271. 
162. Id. at 1272 (rejecting the government's argument that because they had 
a warrant to search the computer, they could search the computer for 
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t ' 163 Th . warran s scope. e court opmed that the magistrate should 
require the officers to state the type of files they sought in the 
warrant, and that the search must be specifically limited to these 
types of files. 164 
The special approach, however, has also been criticized and 
generally deemed useless and inappropriate to govern computer 
searches.
165
_ , This criticism r~sides in the ease that criminals may 
change a files n~m~ or extension to unrelated or unsuspicious topics, ~n~ t_hat thos~ crnn.mals who utilize computers are often sophisticated md~viduals with methods to cover their tracks. 166 For example, in 
United States v. Hill, the court noted that "[t]he ease with which child 
pornography images can be disguised - whether by renaming 
sexyteenyboppersxxx.jpg as sundayschoollesson.doc, or something 
more sophisticated forecloses defendant's proposed search 
methodology. "167 
D. Networked Computer Searches 
_The law regulating the search of computer networks is more 
straightforward: the Fourth Amendment's protection of a user's data 
is :ery limited. T~is is due to the nature of computer networks, 
which usually funct10n as a means of purposefully sharing data with 
other users. 153 Each device on the network is "attached" to the others 
and users use this connection to access shared data. 169 Although using 
163. 
164. 
~ny~hing incriminating in nature, and that plain view justified the 
fmdmg of pornography). 
! ~- a~ 127 4-75 (finding the cabinet analogy inapplicable because the 
files. were adequately labeled and the detective knew what each file 
con tamed and that he was exceeding the scope of the warrant). 
Id. at 1275. 
165. See Clancy, supra note 125, at 206-10. 
166. 
167. 
168. 
See id:, at _2?8 ("'Computer records are extremely susceptible to 
tampermg, hidmg, or destruction, whether deliberate or inadvertent.' 
Images can be hidden in all manner of files, even word processing 
documents a~d sp~eadsheets. Criminals will do all they can to conceal 
contra?and, mclu_dmg the simple expedient of changing the names and 
extens10ns of files to disguise their content from the casual 
observer.") (citation omitted). 
322 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1090-91 (C.D. Cal. 2004). 
See MICHAEL A. GALLO & WILLIAM M. HANCOCK, NETWORKING ~XPLAIN~D 
1
2 (2nd ed. 2002) [hereinafter GALLO] ("Specifically, the term 
networkmg refers to the concept of connecting a group of systems for 
the expressed purpose of sharing information. The systems that are 
connected form a network."). 
169. See_ id. at ~-4 (explaining that a computer network is a "collection" of 
devices, which extend beyond computers to printers, palm pilots, ect., 
that share resources by means of network "medium" and "protocol"). 
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a network does not immediately negate a user's expectation of 
privacy, the knowledge that information transmitted on the ne~work 
is not confidential and may be monitored reduces the expectat10n of 
privacy.170 Even when a user takes steps towar~s ~nsuring that his 
files remain private, courts may find that the obJective component of 
Katz still negates the expectation of privacy.171 The loss of ?ne's 
expectation of privacy usually occurs when the :iser has ~owmgly 
exposed his files to the public and placed them m a locat10n where 
others can access them. 172 
Thus law enforcement may theoretically negate the warrant requirem~nt and search a computer network by obtaining consent ?r 
by the logic of the third party doctrine. Law enforcement may obtam 
consent to search a network, for example, from a network 
administrator employer, or, arguably a co-worker-anyone who has 
' . 113 L 
"joint occupancy" and therefore access to the data. . aw 
enforcement may still choose to seek a warrant; however, when given 
the opportunity to surpass the burdensome requirement, _he will ~ikely 
choose not to. On the other hand, the third party doctnne applies to 
computer networks as well; the user has entrusted his data to a third 
party network host, much like Hoffa entrusted his secrets to a 
170. 
171. 
172. 
173. 
Cf. City of Ontario, Cal. v. Quon, 130 S.Ct. 2619, 2632-33 (201~) 
(discussing that because Quon was_ explicitly . informed that his 
employer-provided pager may be subject to audit, _he may. have no 
expectation of privacy, but finding that the search did i:iot v10late the 
Fourth Amendment on other grounds); see, e.g., Umted States v. 
Heckenkamp, 482 F.3d 1142, 1146-47 (9th Cir. 20_07) (~oldi~g _that the 
defendant still had a reasonable expectation of pnvacy m his files on a 
network absent a policy outlining the active monitoring of the network). 
See, e.g., United States v. Ziegler, 474 F.3d 1184, 1189 (9th Cir. 2007) 
("The government does not cor~test_ Ziegler's claim that he _had ,a 
subjective expectation of privacy m his . . . computer . . . but Ziegler s 
expectation of privacy in his office and workpla~e computer mus~ also be 
seen as objectively reasonable."); see also Umted States v. Ki1:1~' 509 
F.3d 1338, 1342 (11th Cir. 2007) (holding that when a user utilized a 
computer network and knew that his documents were exposed to the 
public, although he took steps to keep his files private, he no longer 
retained a reasonable expectation of privacy). 
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) ("What a person 
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a 
subject of Fourth Amendment protection."); see also United States v. 
King, 509 F.3d 1338, 1341-42 (11th Cir. 2007) (fi~ding tha~ society 
would not recognize the network user's expectation of ~n".'a~y as 
reasonable because his files were shared with thousands of mdividuals 
who had access to the network). 
United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 170-71(1974) (dismis~ing the 
argument that the third party could not give consent, and holdmg that 
consent was valid because she was a "joint occupant"). 
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t ' 153 Th . warran s scope. e court opmed that the magistrate should 
require the officers to state the type of files they sought in the 
warrant, and that the search must be specifically limited to these 
types of files. 164 
The special approach, however, has also been criticized and 
generally deemed useless and inappropriate to govern computer 
searches. 165. , This criticism r~sides in the ease that criminals may 
change a files n~m~ or extens10n to unrelated or unsuspicious topics, ~n~ t.hat thos~ crmimals who utilize computers are often sophisticated 
md~viduals with methods to cover their tracks. 166 For example, in 
United States v. Hill, the court noted that "[t]he ease with which child 
pornography images can be disguised - whether by renaming 
sexyteenyboppersxxx.jpg as sundayschoollesson.doc, or something 
more sophisticated forecloses defendant's proposed search 
methodology. "167 
D. Networked Computer Searches 
The law regulating the search of computer networks is more 
straightforward: the Fourth Amendment's protection of a user's data 
is very limited. This is due to the nature of computer networks 
which usually function as a means of purposefully sharing data with 
other users. 168 Each device on the network is "attached" to the others 
and users use this connection to access shared data. 169 Although using 
anything incriminating in nature, and that plain view justified the 
finding of pornography). 
163 · Id. at 127 4-75 (finding the cabinet analogy inapplicable because the 
"files" were adequately labeled and the detective knew what each file 
contained and that he was exceeding the scope of the warrant). 
164. Id. at 1275. 
165. See Clancy, supra note 125, at 206-10. 
166. See id:, at .2?8 ("'Computer records are extremely susceptible to 
tampermg, hidmg, or destruction, whether deliberate or inadvertent.' 
Images can be hidden in all manner of files, even word processing 
documents and spreadsheets. Criminals will do all they can to conceal 
contra_band, inclu_ding the simple expedient of changing the names and 
extensions of files to disguise their content from the casual 
observer.") (citation omitted). 
167. 322 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1090-91 (C.D. Cal. 2004). 
168. See MICHAEL A. GALLO & WILLIAM M. HANCOCK, NETWORKING ~XPLAIN~D ; (2nd ed. 2002) [hereinafter GALLO] ("Specifically, the term 
networking refers to the concept of connecting a group of systems for 
the expressed purpose of sharing information. The systems that are 
connected form a network."). 
169. See id. at 3-4 (explaining that a computer network is a "collection" of 
devices, which extend beyond computers to printers, palm pilots, ect., 
that share resources by means of network "medium" and "protocol"). 
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a network does not immediately negate a user's expectation of 
privacy, the knowledge that information transmitted on the ne~work 
is not confidential and may be monitored reduces the expectat10n of 
privacy.170 Even when a user takes steps towards ensuring that his 
files remain private, courts may find that the objective component of 
Katz still negates the expectation of privacy. 171 The loss of ?ne's 
expectation of privacy usually occurs when the ~ser has ~owmgly 
exposed his files to the public and placed them m a locat10n where 
others can access them. 172 
Thus law enforcement may theoretically negate the warrant requirem~nt and search a computer network by obtaining consent ?r 
by the logic of the third party doctrine. Law enforcement may obtam 
consent to search a network, for example, from a network 
administrator employer or, arguably a co-worker-anyone who has 
' ' . 173 L 
"joint occupancy" and therefore access to the data. . aw 
enforcement may still choose to seek a warrant; however, when given 
the opportunity to surpass the burdensome requirement, .he will ~ikely 
choose not to. On the other hand, the third party doctrme applies to 
computer networks as well; the user has entrusted his data to a third 
party network host, much like Hoffa entrusted his secrets to a 
170. 
171. 
172. 
173. 
Cf. City of Ontario, Cal. v. Quon, 130 S.Ct. 2619, 2632-33 (201~) 
(discussing that because Quon was. explicitly . informed that his 
employer-provided pager may be subject to audit, _he may. have no 
expectation of privacy, but finding that the search did i:ot v10late the 
Fourth Amendment on other grounds); see, e.g., Umted States v. 
Heckenkamp, 482 F.3d 1142, 1146-47 (9th Cir. 2~07) (~oldi~g .that the 
defendant still had a reasonable expectation of privacy m his files on a 
network absent a policy outlining the active monitoring of the network). 
See, e.g., United States v. Ziegler, 474 F.3d 1184, 1189 (9th Cir. 2007) 
("The government does not co:r~test. Ziegler's claim that he .had ,a 
subjective expectation of privacy m hrn . . . computer . . . but Ziegler s 
expectation of privacy in his office and workpla~e computer mus~ also be 
seen as objectively reasonable."); see also U mted States v. Kii:~' 509 
F.3d 1338, 1342 (11th Cir. 2007) (holding that when a user utilized a 
computer network and knew that his documents were exposed to the 
public, although he took steps to keep his files private, he no longer 
retained a reasonable expectation of privacy). 
Katz v. United States 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) ("What a person 
knowingly exposes to th~ public, even in his own home or office, is not a 
subject of Fourth Amendment protection."); see also United State~ v. 
King, 509 F.3d 1338, 1341-42 (11th C~. 2007) (fi~ding tha~ society 
would not recognize the network user s expectat10n of ~n".'a~y as 
reasonable because his files were shared with thousands of mdividuals 
who had access to the network). 
United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 170-71(1974) (dismissing the 
argument that the third party could not give consent, and holding that 
consent was valid because she was a "joint occupant"). 
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government agent, and has misplaced his reliance that the third party 
will not share his data with law enforcement. 174 
A fundamental distinction exists between the cloud and computer 
networks. A. computer network is not the Internet. 175 Typically, 
when. a user is part of a computer network, he is aware that he 
allowmg other network users access to his files and media and 
therefore can plan what he saves and stores on the network d. 1 176 I 
accor mg y. n the alternative, although a user may create a 
personal "network" on the cloud by accessing his material from 
multiple computers, tablets, and smartphones unless the user 
knowingly invites others to join his "network," his files and media 
remain private.177 This difference makes it dangerous to compare the 
cloud to a computer network for the purposes of determining Fourth A~endm~nt ~rotections. F~r example, a Dropbox user has the ability 
to share a file or folder with others.178 However, if the user chooses 
not to utilize this feature, his files remain private. 179 Even if the user 
has installed the Dropbox application on multiple devices, he is the 
only one who can access these files, provided that he has not shared 
his passw~rd. with others. 180 Thus, because a user has not knowingly 
exposed his files and media to a public network when using the cloud 
he has not foregone his expectation of privacy in the same way ~ 
computer network user has. 
IV. SEARCHING THE CLOUD 
The solution is simple. If a law enforcement agent wishes to se~rch the cloud, he must obtain a warrant; anything less than this 
stnct requirement violates the Fourth Amendment and is 
unconstitutional. A warrantless search and seizure of data from a 
cloud network account is unreasonable. 
174. 
175. 
176. 
177. 
Hoffa v. United S~ates, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966) ("[PJetitioner, in a 
word, v:ras :z::ot relymg or: the security of the hotel room; he was relying 
upon his misplaced confidence that [the third party] would not reveal his wrongdoing."). 
See GALLO, supra note 168, at 9. 
Id. at 2 (describing the purpose of a network is to share information 
with others). 
See D!l?PBOX: TERMS OF SERVICE, https://www.dropbox.com/terms 
(last visited Oct. 29, 2012) (explaining an optional feature that allows a 
user to share his files with. others). 
178. I~. ("The Services provide features that allow you to share your stuff 
with others or to make it public."). 
179. Id. 
180. See id. 
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Three points support the conclusion that a law enforcement agent 
must be required to obtain a separate warrant. First, pursuant to 
Katz there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in the cloud. Seco~d, a warrant search of a computer does not extend to and 
encompass the cloud. Third, any attempts to circumvent the warrant 
requirement are unsupported by law. 
A. There Is an Expectation of Privacy in the Cloud 
The Fourth Amendment protects cloud network accounts because 
a user has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the cloud. This 
protection is derived from the application of Katz's tw~-~art 
reasonable expectation of privacy test; that the person has exhibited 
an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy ~n t~e area to be 
searched and that expectation is one that society is prepared to 
' . . ) is1 A · f recognize as reasonable (the objective component . . companson o 
cloud computing to the protections afforded to, or stnpped from, the 
mail and the garbage provide support for this conclusion.182 . . 
First, the subjective aspect of Katz is satisfied. Users mamtam a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in files saved on the cloud. 
Primarily, this is because many cloud network users utilize it for 
private, personal means: to either back up data or to store documents 
in an easily accessible location.183 Users do not assume that cloud 
network providers will snoop in or share their files, and are concerned 
when presented with a situation in which unauthorized or uninformed 
access may occur .184 
Comparably, the Supreme Court has routinely held t~at law 
enforcement must seek a warrant before an agent is permitted to 
search the contents of a piece of mail that a person has voluntarily 
turned over to the third-party USPS.185 In these types of situations, 
although the sender places his letters and packages into ~he ha~ds of 
a third party, he has not foregone his expectation of pnv~cy m the 
contents of his mail. 186 The same concept may be applied to the 
181. United States v. Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967). 
182. See supra Section III(A)(l) for a discussion of the reasonable 
expectation of privacy in regards to the mail and the garbage. 
183. Horrigan, supra note 10 (reporting the vari~us ways :isers )utilize the 
cloud, which include storing personal photos, files, and videos . 
184. Id. (reporting when those surveyed were given ways providers may ~se 
their files, users "report[edJ high levels of concern when presen~ed with 
scenarios in which companies may put their data to uses of which they 
may not be aware"). 
185. Ex Parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1978); United States v. Van 
Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249, 252 (1970). 
186. Ex Parte Jackson, 96 U.S. at 733 ("Letters and sealed pacdkages of ~his 
kind in the mail are as fully guarded from examination an inspect10n, 
except as to their outward form and weight.") (emphasis added). 
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government agent, and has misplaced his reliance that the third party 
will not share his data with law enforcement. 174 
A fundamental distinction exists between the cloud and computer 
networks. A. computer network is not the Internet. 175 Typically, 
when. a user is part of a computer network, he is aware that he 
allowmg other network users access to his files and media and 
therefore can plan what he saves and stores on the network d. 1 176 I 
accor mg y. n the alternative, although a user may create a 
personal "network" on the cloud by accessing his material from 
multiple computers, tablets, and smartphones unless the user 
knowingly invites others to join his "network," his files and media 
remain private.177 This difference makes it dangerous to compare the 
cloud to a computer network for the purposes of determining Fourth A~endm~nt ~rotections. F~r example, a Dropbox user has the ability 
to share a file or folder with others.178 However, if the user chooses 
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has installed the Dropbox application on multiple devices, he is the 
only one who can access these files, provided that he has not shared 
his passw~rd. with others. 180 Thus, because a user has not knowingly 
exposed his files and media to a public network when using the cloud 
he has not foregone his expectation of privacy in the same way ~ 
computer network user has. 
IV. SEARCHING THE CLOUD 
The solution is simple. If a law enforcement agent wishes to se~rch the cloud, he must obtain a warrant; anything less than this 
stnct requirement violates the Fourth Amendment and is 
unconstitutional. A warrantless search and seizure of data from a 
cloud network account is unreasonable. 
174. 
175. 
176. 
177. 
Hoffa v. United S~ates, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966) ("[PJetitioner, in a 
word, v:ras :z::ot relymg or: the security of the hotel room; he was relying 
upon his misplaced confidence that [the third party] would not reveal his wrongdoing."). 
See GALLO, supra note 168, at 9. 
Id. at 2 (describing the purpose of a network is to share information 
with others). 
See D!l?PBOX: TERMS OF SERVICE, https://www.dropbox.com/terms 
(last visited Oct. 29, 2012) (explaining an optional feature that allows a 
user to share his files with. others). 
178. I~. ("The Services provide features that allow you to share your stuff 
with others or to make it public."). 
179. Id. 
180. See id. 
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Three points support the conclusion that a law enforcement agent 
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Katz there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in the cloud. Seco~d, a warrant search of a computer does not extend to and 
encompass the cloud. Third, any attempts to circumvent the warrant 
requirement are unsupported by law. 
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protection is derived from the application of Katz's tw~-~art 
reasonable expectation of privacy test; that the person has exhibited 
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searched and that expectation is one that society is prepared to 
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cloud computing to the protections afforded to, or stnpped from, the 
mail and the garbage provide support for this conclusion.182 . . 
First, the subjective aspect of Katz is satisfied. Users mamtam a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in files saved on the cloud. 
Primarily, this is because many cloud network users utilize it for 
private, personal means: to either back up data or to store documents 
in an easily accessible location.183 Users do not assume that cloud 
network providers will snoop in or share their files, and are concerned 
when presented with a situation in which unauthorized or uninformed 
access may occur .184 
Comparably, the Supreme Court has routinely held t~at law 
enforcement must seek a warrant before an agent is permitted to 
search the contents of a piece of mail that a person has voluntarily 
turned over to the third-party USPS.185 In these types of situations, 
although the sender places his letters and packages into ~he ha~ds of 
a third party, he has not foregone his expectation of pnv~cy m the 
contents of his mail. 186 The same concept may be applied to the 
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182. See supra Section III(A)(l) for a discussion of the reasonable 
expectation of privacy in regards to the mail and the garbage. 
183. Horrigan, supra note 10 (reporting the vari~us ways :isers )utilize the 
cloud, which include storing personal photos, files, and videos . 
184. Id. (reporting when those surveyed were given ways providers may ~se 
their files, users "report[edJ high levels of concern when presen~ed with 
scenarios in which companies may put their data to uses of which they 
may not be aware"). 
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197 
JouRNALOFLAw, TECHNOLOGY&THElNTERNET · VoL. 4 · No.1·2012 
Searching the Clouds 
cloud. A cloud user has placed his files and media into the hands of 
the third-party cloud provider, and entrusts the third party will store 
and provide access to the files, but does not expect the provider to 
look at them. 
Comparing the cloud network to the mail also provides another 
piece of support for the subjective expectation of privacy. The 
cont~nts of the mail receive Fourth Amendment protection, not the 
physical envelope and address that have been exposed to the public 
eye. 137 The security notifications Dropbox provides state that the 
only information its employees have access to is the metadata which 
is comprised of the file name and location. 188 This similarity p'rovides 
direct support for the subjective expectation of privacy: users who 
accept these policies and choose to use the particular cloud network 
account based on these policies, have a reasonable subjective 
expectation of privacy. 
Katz's objective aspect, that society recognizes the expectation of 
pri:ac~ as reasonable, is also satisfied through similar reasoning. 
Objectively, the cloud differs from searching garbage because no risk 
exists that once a user saves or "relinquishes" a file to a cloud 
account, that snoops and scavengers will ravage it. In fact, to further 
dis~inguish the cloud from the garbage, it is unlikely that anyone 
besides the user may view the file because he has not digitally left it 
out in the open the way the trash is left on the curb. 189 Thus, under 
Greenwood, simply placing data in the hands of a provider does not 
negate the expectation of privacy because others still may not obtain 
it. 
Further, the government has acknowledged that there is an 
expectation of privacy in the contents of a physical hard drive, and 
law enforcement has begun to include a computer on warrant 
applications, obtain a second warrant when an unanticipated 
computer is . located, or justify why the initial warrant covered 
searching the computer .190 The cloud should be viewed in the same 
manner, because the cloud network is just another location albeit an 
off-site location, where a user will store data. Moreover,' if a user 
believed that the government could access data saved on the cloud at 
187. Id. 
188. DROPBOX: SEC. TERMS, https://www.dropbox.com/security (last visited 
Mar. 26, 2012) (Dropbox employees are prohibited from viewing the 
conte.nt of fil~s y~u store in your Dropbox account, and are only 
permitted to view file metadata (e.g., file names and locations)."). 
189. See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40-41 (1988) (describing one's 
lowered expectation of privacy when they take the trash out). 
190. See, ~·~·, United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1270-71 (1999) 
( explammg that law enforcement sought an additional warrant to search 
unanticipated computers). 
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any time, use of the cloud network would likely not be as prevalent. 
To compare the cloud to the mail again, patrons of the USPS would 
not surrender their mail as easily if they thought the government 
could open and search any letter or package. Part of the USPS' 
success is contingent upon the government understanding that 
privacy rights must be respected. The same reasoning must be 
applied to the cloud, and, in fact, already has been. . 
Therefore because Katz's reasonable expectation of privacy test is 
satisfied, the' answer to the initial hypothetical must be that law 
enforcement is required to obtain a separate warrant. 191 
B. Warrants to Search a Hard Drive Do Not Include Searching the 
Cloud 
The Fourth Amendment protects a physical computer hard drive, 
and several methods of computer search doctrine have evolved with 
these protections in mind. . However, these search methodologies .are 
contingent upon the files or media being saved on the. physical 
computer, and cannot be extended to files that are stored directly on 
the cloud.192 Yet, each method offers some insight into why law 
enforcement needs a separate warrant for searching a cloud network 
account. 
Arguably, the container view offers the most persuasive reason for 
why a separate warrant is necessary. The container view, in term~ of 
computer searches, is contingent on the principle that the. p~ysical 
computer itself is the container; the law does not support definmg the 
container as all of the user's computer data. 193 Thus, the warrant 
would cover the data the user saved within the container, and in the 
case of a computer, this data is saved on the computer's physical hard 
drive. Documents that are saved in a cloud network account are not 
located within the computer-container, and, furthermore, when a user 
chooses to save data on the cloud, he is purposely choosing not to 
place his data in a computer-container. 
To provide further support, the law has alrea.dy started t? tr.end 
in this direction. For example, the Electromc Commumcat10ns 
Privacy Act194 and the Stored Wire and Electronic Communications 
191. See supra Section I. 
192. 
193. 
I acknowledge that some cloud programs, such as . Drop box, save a_n 
additional copy of document onto the user's hard dnve. Howev~r, this 
changes the analysis regarding searching the ?loud network. !his Note 
assumes that the user is using the cloud service as the exclusive means 
to save their files and media, and there are no back-ups saved on the 
computer hard drive. 
See discussion supra Section III(C)(l). 
194. Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2510-2522 
(2002) (regulating the interception of· transmitted electronic 
communications). 
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cloud. A cloud user has placed his files and media into the hands of 
the third-party cloud provider, and entrusts the third party will store 
and provide access to the files, but does not expect the provider to 
look at them. 
Comparing the cloud network to the mail also provides another 
piece of support for the subjective expectation of privacy. The 
contents of the mail receive Fourth Amendment protection, not the 
physical envelope and address that have been exposed to the public 
eye. 187 The security notifications Dropbox provides state that the 
only information its employees have access to is the metadata which 
. ' is comprised of the file name and location.188 This similarity provides 
direct support for the subjective expectation of privacy: users who 
accept these policies and choose to use the particular cloud network 
account based on these policies, have a reasonable subjective 
expectation of privacy. 
Katz's objective aspect, that society recognizes the expectation of 
pri:ac~ as reasonable, is also satisfied through similar reasoning. 
Objectively, the cloud differs from searching garbage because no risk 
exists that once a user saves or "relinquishes" a file to a cloud 
account, that snoops and scavengers will ravage it. In fact, to further 
distinguish the cloud from the garbage, it is unlikely that anyone 
besides the user may view the file because he has not digitally left it 
out in the open the way the trash is left on the curb. 189 Thus, under 
Greenwood, simply placing data in the hands of a provider does not 
negate the expectation of privacy because others still may not obtain 
it. 
Further, the government has acknowledged that there is an 
expectation of privacy in the contents of a physical hard drive, and 
law enforcement has begun to include a computer on warrant 
applications, obtain a second warrant when an unanticipated 
computer is . located, or justify why the initial warrant covered 
searching the computer .190 The cloud should be viewed in the same 
manner, because the cloud network is just another location, albeit an 
off-site location, where a user will store data. Moreover, if a user 
believed that the government could access data saved on the cloud at 
187. Id. 
188. DROPBOX: SEC. TERMS, https://www.dropbox.com/security (last visited 
Mar. 26, 2012) (Dropbox employees are prohibited from viewing the 
content of files you store in your Dropbox account, and are only 
permitted to view file metadata (e.g., file names and locations)."). 
189. See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40-41 (1988) (describing one's 
lowered expectation of privacy when they take the trash out). 
190. See, ~·~·, United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1270-71 (1999) 
( explammg that law enforcement sought an additional warrant to search 
unanticipated computers). 
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any time, use of the cloud network would likely not be as prevalent. 
To compare the cloud to the mail again, patrons of the USPS would 
not surrender their mail as easily if they thought the government 
could open and search any letter or package. Part of the USPS' 
success is contingent upon the government understanding that 
privacy rights must be respected. The same reasoning must be 
applied to the cloud, and, in fact, already has been. . 
Therefore because Katz's reasonable expectation of privacy test is 
satisfied, the' answer to the initial .hypothetical must be that law 
enforcement is required to obtain a separate warrant. 191 
B. Warrants to Search a Hard Drive Do Not Include Searching the 
Cloud 
The Fourth Amendment protects a physical computer hard drive, 
and several methods of computer search doctrine have evolved with 
these protections in mind. . However, these search methodologies .are 
contingent upon the files or media being saved on the. physical 
computer, and cannot be extended to files that are stored directly on 
the cloud.192 Yet, each method offers some insight into why law 
enforcement needs a separate warrant for searching a cloud network 
account. 
Arguably, the container view offers the most persuasive reason for 
why a separate warrant is necessary. The container view, in term~ of 
computer searches, is contingent on the principle that the. p~ysical 
computer itself is the container; the law does not support definmg the 
container as all of the user's computer data. 193 Thus, the warrant 
would cover the data the user saved within the container, and in the 
case of a computer, this data is saved on the computer's physical hard 
drive. Documents that are saved in a cloud network account are not 
located within the computer-container, and, furthermore, when a user 
chooses to save data on the cloud, he is purposely choosing not to 
place his data in a computer-container. 
To provide further support, the law has alrea.dy started t? tr.end 
in this direction. For example, the Electromc Commumcat10ns 
Privacy Act194 and the Stored Wire and Electronic Communications 
191. See supra Section I. 
192. I acknowledge that some cloud programs, such as Dropbox, save a.n 
additional copy of document onto the user's hard drive. Howev~r, this 
changes the analysis regarding searching the ?loud network. !'his Note 
assumes that the user is using the cloud service as the exclusive means 
to save their files and media, and there are no back-ups saved on the 
computer hard drive. 
193. See discussion supra Section III(C)(l). 
194. Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2510-2522 
(2002) (regulating the interception of · transmitted electronic 
communications). 
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195 
inherently reject the view that a container encompasses 
communication the user has not saved in the computer-container, as 
these laws provide means of obtaining documents directly from a 
remote server or communications provider. 196 These laws show that 
Congress inherently recognizes that a user has the capability of using 
multiple electronic storage containers, and that one warrant does not 
cover all of them. 
There is similar reasoning for why the sub-container method also 
does not allow an officer who is conducting a warrant search to access 
the cloud. If the sub-container view is applied to the computer, and 
the search is regulated to folders or portions of the hard drive, two 
things are evident. 197 First, the cloud is not a part of the hard drive, 
and cannot be classified a sub-container of the hard drive. Second, 
insofar as the cloud is considered a sub-container of the user's data 
storage, a separate warrant, which lists the cloud storage specifically, 
is necessary. 
Similarly, "special" search restrictions also do not allow law 
enforcement to search the cloud. If the magistrate applies special 
restrictions to the search, such as limiting the search to only . JPG 
files, the officer cannot use that warrant to search the cloud for the 
.JPG files that may be located there. 198 The agent must continue to 
abide by the· search parameters put forth in the particularity 
requirements in the warrant, and must obtain a second warrant if he 
feels the need to exceed the warrant's parameters. 
Further support for the exclusion of the cloud under these 
methodologies is derived from searches of physical premises. For 
example, the law does not allow police to search for all physical 
papers related to drugs, and then access a storage container across 
town on the same warrant to search for more files related to drugs, 
simply because the police have a warrant to search for the type of 
document that may be stored there. 199 In this scenario, the police 
must seek two warrants because the police have established two 
separate sets of probable cause: first, probable cause to search the 
house for the papers, and second, probable cause to search the storage 
195. Stored Wire and Electronic Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-
2725 (2002) (regulating the search of stored electronic communications). 
196. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2703(b)(A), 2703(B)(i), 2703(B)(ii) (2002) (requiring a 
subpoena or warrant to obtain documents from a remote computing provider). 
197. See discussion supra Section III(C)(2). 
198. See discussion supra Section III(C)(3). 
199. Cf. Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 563 (2004) (describing the 
particularity requirements of a warrant, and noting that the warrant 
must describe, with particularity, the place to be searched or the items 
to be seized). 
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unit for papers. If the initial warrant specificall~ limits the s~~rc~ to 
h olice cannot use the commonality between e . w_o 
the house, t e p th d location This scenano is 
sets of probable cause to enter e se~on h" . the cloud If the 
exactly what law enforcement faces w en searc mg f the. search 
k . hysical computer none o storage loc er is a P · ' Th s the Fourth 
d 1 . . t "fy the search across town. u ' 
metho o ogies JUS i t t be obtained to search a Amendment requires that a separa e warran 
separate container· . . t earch methods 
Overall, ~ecause . ~0:0e s~~r~~e t~~~1:~ c~::~h:r i:ethods actually 
allowshlaw en orce~teyn that they exclude th~ police from the cloud, the 
hold t e commona i L f ement must 
answer to the hypothetical remains the same. aw en ore 
obtain a separate warrant. 
The Fourth Amendment's Warrant Requirement is Not Negated by c. 
an Exception 
The final reason that law enforcement must obtain. a warr~nt 
. h" the cloud is that the two warrant except10ns, which 
before searc mg 1. bl the third party doctrine and bly the most app ica e, 1 
are artgua hes do not negate the warrant requirement. The aw consen searc , · . . 
d" . this direction for qmte some time. 
has been tren mg m . t. . d the third party doctrine in Recently, Justice Sotomayor en icize 
United States v. Jones.200 She wrote: 
[T]his approach is ill suited to the digital age, in ~hie~ p~~~l~ 
eal a great deal of information about themse ves o ir 
rev f · out mundane tasks. · · · Parties in the course o carrymg tt . 
. 1 t ti"on they can a ain [W] h tever the societa . expec a ' const~tutionally protected status only if our Fourth Amen~~~; 
. . s to treat secrecy as a prereqmsi e JU~isprudenlce c~~s:ot assume that all information voluntarily 
pnvacy. wou l" ·t d ose is d. 1 d to some member of the public for a imi e purp ' 
isc ose . t"tl d t Fourth Amendment for that reason alone; disen i e o 
t . 201 protec 10n. 
. e from Justice Sotomayor's concurrence indicate~ two 
. Th.is passag h b r s that Katz's existing expectation of pnvacy 
thmgs. First, s e e ieve . t chnologies 202 However, this t t still be applied to emergmg e · . 
11 es can. . . t the idea that complete secrecy, especia y 
concept is_ c?ntmgenldupohn Id not be a prerequisite for Fourth in the digital wor , s ou 
t . 203 Amendment protec ions. 
200. 132 S.Ct. 945, 957 (2012). 
201. Id. 
See id. (as indicated by the passage above). 202. 
203. Id. 
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inherently reject the view that a container encompasses 
communication the user has not saved in the computer-container, as 
these laws provide means of obtaining documents directly from a 
remote server or communications provider. 196 These laws show that 
Congress inherently recognizes that a user has the capability of using 
multiple electronic storage containers, and that one warrant does not 
cover all of them. 
There is similar reasoning for why the sub-container method also 
does not allow an officer who is conducting a warrant search to access 
the cloud. If the sub-container view is applied to the computer, and 
the search is regulated to folders or portions of the hard drive, two 
things are evident. 197 First, the cloud is not a part of the hard drive, 
and cannot be classified a sub-container of the hard drive. Second, 
insofar as the cloud is considered a sub-container of the user's data 
storage, a separate warrant, which lists the cloud storage specifically, 
is necessary. 
Similarly, "special" search restrictions also do not allow law 
enforcement to search the cloud. If the magistrate applies special 
restrictions to the search, such as limiting the search to only . JPG 
files, the officer cannot use that warrant to search the cloud for the 
.JPG files that may be located there. 198 The agent must continue to 
abide by the· search parameters put forth in the particularity 
requirements in the warrant, and must obtain a second warrant if he 
feels the need to exceed the warrant's parameters. 
Further support for the exclusion of the cloud under these 
methodologies is derived from searches of physical premises. For 
example, the law does not allow police to search for all physical 
papers related to drugs, and then access a storage container across 
town on the same warrant to search for more files related to drugs, 
simply because the police have a warrant to search for the type of 
document that may be stored there. 199 In this scenario, the police 
must seek two warrants because the police have established two 
separate sets of probable cause: first, probable cause to search the 
house for the papers, and second, probable cause to search the storage 
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2725 (2002) (regulating the search of stored electronic communications). 
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subpoena or warrant to obtain documents from a remote computing 
provider). 
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thmgs. First, s e e iev . t chnologies 202 However, this t t till be applied to emergmg e · . 
11 es can. s. t· t upon the idea that complete secrecy, especia y 
concept is. c?n mgenld h ld not be a prerequisite for Fourth in the d1g1tal wor , s ou 
t . 203 Amendment protec 10ns. 
200. 132 S.Ct. 945, 957 (2012). 
201. Id. 
See id. (as indicated by the passage above). 202. 
203. Id. 
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As Katz's reasonable expectation of privacy test is satisfied, 204 the 
Fourth Amendment protects the cloud, and a warrant exception does 
not negate these protections. Thus, when a cloud network user saves 
his data to his personal cloud account, for the limited purposes of 
storing, protecting, and accessing his documents, he does not lose the 
Fourth Amendment's protections because he has entrusted his 
documents to a third party. Moreover, the privacy policies of cloud 
providers like Dropbox, which advertise that the company may look 
at documents for limited purposes,205 does not implicate the third-
party doctrine. 
The law does not support stretching the third party doctrine to 
negate the Fourth Amendment's protections of the cloud just to allow 
law enforcement easier access to a user's stored data. The third party 
doctrine was meant to apply to situations where a user purposely puts 
information into the public sphere, foregoing his expectation of 
privacy; for example, when a defendant knowingly speaks about his 
criminal activities to a third party. 206 In Hoffa, the Court specified 
that the defendant had taken the risk in choosing in whom to place 
his trust, and had not been relying on the security of his hotel room, 
which was a constitutionally protected area. 207 However, a cloud 
network user is not taking the same type of risk; he is instead relying 
on the security of the "room." The user has not disclosed the 
contents of his files to the provider the way Hoffa told the informant 
his secrets. Nor has the user, in most cases, disclosed the files by 
creating a public network with others who may play a role analogous 
to that of the government informant. Instead, the user relies on 
Fourth Amendment protection via his expectation of privacy: he is in 
a constitutionally protected area, and no law enforcement agent can 
gain access to his room, or his cloud account, without a warrant. 
Furthermore, returning to the mail analogy, a cloud network 
provider acts similarly to the USPS, transporting data (mail) from 
204. See supra Section IV(A). 
205. DROPBOX: SEC. TERMS, https://www.dropbox.com/security (last visited 
Mar. 26, 2012) ("Like most online services, we ·have a small number of 
employees who must be able to access user data for the reasons stated in 
our privacy policy (e.g., when legally required to do so). But that's the 
rare exception, not the rule. We have strict policy and technical access 
controls that prohibit employee access except in these rare 
circumstances."). 
206. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 301 (1966). 
207. Id. at 302 ("[P]etitioner, in a word, was not relying on the security of 
the hotel room; he was relying upon his misplaced confidence that [the 
third party] would not reveal his wrongdoing."). 
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o · £ d t negate t e warran the expectation of privacy' and there ore oes no 
requMirement. a cloud network provider is n. ot the type of entity that 
oreover h · ' count 
ant c~nsent for law enforcement to searc its user s ~c . 
;"'y grth· d party to grant law enforcement access to the files, o~e c~~r:cter~:tic must be present: joint ownership or control over t e 
b rched 211 In the case of an internal computer networ~, ;~c~y, ea s::cond .factor is also ::;:~ves:m~~~i~;rsc:h:~~~e i~r~: •: 
being searched has ~o~~nfly i:to the public ey~.212 Consequently, 
physica; file or ~o::~ e~ana :~pass the warrant requirement when 
law en1orcemen a user has knowingly placed 
searching a computer network because . . ·t and the 
his data into the public eye, .w~e~e other ushe~s coarn C:~:roil 'over the 
kn that there IS Jomt owners Ip ~:~~o:~~ as ~w:etwork administrator often runs and polices network 
213 F" t 
use. I th f the cloud neither of these factors is present.. rrs , 
n, e case o d ;oviders do not have joint ownership and 
cloud network users an p k ' data· in fact the user regains t 1 a cloud networ user s ' ' 
con rol over h. teri·als 214 The cloud network provider is merely a contro over is ma · 
S 727 733 (1878) (describing how the 208. See Ex Parte Jackson, .96 U. ·i d' the constitutional implications of federal mail service carries mai an 
their temporary possession). 
397 US 249 253 (1970) (upholding law 209. United States v. Va~ Leeufwthen, kag~ for the time reasonable to gain a 
enforcement's detention o e pac 
warrant). 
210. Cf. id. (not negating reasonableness ac or o e I £ t f th t"ming issue because of 
a warrant exception). 
. 497 U S 177 181 (1990) (noting that the 211. See Illinois v. Rodr!guez, l ~ohlbiti~n of warrantless entry of a 
Fourth Amendment s genera l p where voluntary consent has been person's home does not app y 
obtained). 
See supra note 172 and accompanying text. 212. 
See id.· see also supra Section III(B)(2). 
213. · ' OF SERVICE, DROPBOX· TERMS 
214. See, e.g., /term~ (last visited Mar. 26, 2012) ("You https://www.drop~ox.com t ff W don't claim any ownership to any retain full ownership to your s u . e 
of it."). 
203 
JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY& THE INTERNET· VOL. 4 ·No. I· 2012 
Searching the Clouds 
As Katz's reasonable expectation of privacy test is satisfied,204 the 
Fourth Amendment protects the cloud, and a warrant exception does 
not negate these protections. Thus, when a cloud network user saves 
his .data to his. personal cloud account, for the limited purposes of 
stormg, protectmg, and accessing his documents, he does not lose the 
Fourth Amendment's protections because he has entrusted his 
documents to a third party. Moreover, the privacy policies of cloud 
providers like Dropb6x, which advertise that the company may look 
at documents for limited purposes,205 does not implicate the third-
party doctrine. 
The law does not support stretching the third party doctrine to 
negate the Fourth Amendment's protections of the cloud just to allow 
law e~forcement easier access to a user's stored data. The third party 
?octrme .was ~eant to apply to situations where a user purposely puts m~ormat10n mto the public sphere, foregoing his expectation of 
pnvacy; for example, when a defendant knowingly speaks about his 
criminal activities to a third party. 206 In Hoff a, the Court specified t~at the defendant had taken the risk in choosing in whom to place 
hrn trust, and had not been relying on the security of his hotel room 
which was a constitutionally protected area. 207 However, a cloud 
network user is not taking the same type of risk; he is instead relying 
on the security of the "room." The user has not disclosed the 
contents of his files to the provider the way Hoffa told the informant 
his s~crets. N?r has the user, in most cases, disclosed the files by 
creatmg a public network with others who may play a role analogous 
to that of the government informant. Instead, the user relies on 
Fourth Amendment protection via his expectation of privacy: he is in 
a ~onstitutiona~y protected area, and no law enforcement agent can 
gam access to his room, or his cloud account, without a warrant. 
Furthermore, returning to the mail analogy, a cloud network 
provider acts similarly to the USPS, transporting data (mail) from 
204. See supra Section IV(A). 
205. DROPBOX: SEC. TERMS, https://www.dropbox.com/security (last visited 
Mar. 26, 2012) ("Like most online services, we ·have a small number of 
employees who must be able to access user data for the reasons stated in 
our privac~ policy (e.g., when legally required to do so). But that's the 
rare except10n, not the rule. We have strict policy and technical access 
controls that prohibit employee access except in these rare 
circumstances."). 
206. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 301 (1966). 
207. Id. at 302 ("[P]etitioner, in _a word, was not relying on the security of th~ hotel room; he was relymg upon his misplaced confidence that [the 
thrrd party] would not reveal his wrongdoing."). 
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one location to another and holding it in the meantime. 208 If the 
USPS is suspicious of a package and brings it to a law enforcement 
agent's attention, and the agent wishes to look at the contents, he 
must obtain a warrant. 209 In Van Leeuwen, the Supreme Court 
clearly demonstrated that a third party's transportation or storage. of 
somebody's materials does not automatically negate the expectation 
of privacy.2io Accordingly, the third party doctrine does not negate 
the expectation of privacy, and therefore does not negate the warrant 
requirement. . 
Moreover a cloud network provider is not the type of entity that 
' . ' t may grant consent for law enforcement to search its user s accoun . 
For a third party to grant law enforcement access to the files, one 
characteristic must be present: joint ownership or control over the 
area to be searched.211 In the case of an internal computer network, 
typically, a second factor is also involved: the person whose .ar~a is 
being searched has knowingly placed something, whether it is a 
physical file or computer data, into the public eye.212 Consequently, 
law enforcement often can surpass the warrant requirement when 
searching a computer network because a user has ~owi~gly placed 
his data into the public eye, where other users can VIew it, and the 
user also knows that there is joint ownership or control over the 
network, as a network administrator often runs and polices network 
use.213 
In the case of the cloud, neither of these factors is present. First, 
cloud i:ietwork users and providers do not have joint ownership and 
control over a cloud network user's data; in fact, the user regains 
control over his materials. 214 The cloud network provider is merely a 
208. 
209. 
210. 
211. 
See Ex Parle Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1878) (describing h~w the 
federal mail service carries mail and the constitutional implications of 
their temporary possession). 
United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249, 253 (1970) (upholding .law 
enforcement's detention of the package for the time reasonable to gam a 
warrant). 
Cf. id. (not negating reasonableness factor of the timing issue because of 
a warrant exception). 
See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181 (1990) (noting that the 
Fourth Amendment's general prohibition of warrantless entry of a 
person's home does not apply where voluntary consent has been 
obtained). 
212. See supra note 172 and accompanying text. 
213 .. See id.; see also supra Section III(B)(2). 
S e g DROPBOX: TERMS OF SERVICE, 214. ee, · ., ) ("Y 
https://www.dropbox.com/terms (last visited Mar. 26, 201~ ou 
retain full ownership to your stuff. We don't claim any ownership to any 
of it."). 
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V. CONCLUSION: GET A WARRANT 
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that "[w]h ompre enszve Drug Testing noted in dicta 
ere computers are not near e h th ' ' 
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' searc mig t J. ust ·fy . . . 
computers many miles awa .1 . e~ammmg files in 
data could have been shurtl o: a ~eory that mcnmmating electronic 
fast, cheap networking has ~ad:~t con~ealed there. !he advent of 
remote third-party locations[.]" 217 T:eo~~bl~ ~· st~re mformation at 
that requesting that people n t t .1. mt Ircmt then recognized their files and med1·a was "n o u 1,~ze current technology to store 
o answer as ·t ". l 
or luxury of the very rich; it's a way ~f lif: "21!s no onger a peculiarity 
The Fourth Amendment t t · 
the cloud network In th pro ec .s, an~ must continue to protect, 
this Note the law . .c e hypothetical discussed at the beginning of 
' en1orcement agent's xt t 
second warrant to search th t' nel s ep would be to obtain a 
e suspec s c oud account. Through his 
215. See, e.g., id. ("You are solely re .bl £ 
of your files and folders and spons1 e or _YOl1:r conduct, the content 
using the Services."). ' your commumcat1ons with others while 
216. But see Rodriguez, at 188-189 (1990) (" h 
[of the search] could conceivabl be h the surrounding circumstances 
doubt its truth and not act y ~tuc . ~ at a reasonable person would 
other factual determination~po~ I . wit out further inquiry. As with 
determination of consent to enter ean~~' u~on searc~ and seizure, 
standard: would the facts availab:u: ~e JUd.ged agamst an objective 
'warrant a man of reasonable caution i~ t e off~ce; "at the moment. . . 
party had authority over the premises?").the belief that the consenting 
217. United States v Compreh . D 
(9th Cir. 2010) (en bane). ens1ve rug Testing, Inc., 621F.3d1162, 1176 
218. Id. at 1177. 
204 
JouRNALOFLAw, TECHNOLOGY&THElNTERNET · VoL.4 · No.1·2012 
Searching the Clouds 
search pursuant to the first warrant, the agent has established 
probable cause to support a warrant application to search the 
suspect's cloud account. Thus, after his warrant is reviewed and 
possibly granted, he may either show the warrant to the suspect and 
request, politely, that he be given access to the cloud account, or he 
may bring the warrant to the cloud network provider and obtain the 
data, or means to access the data, directly from them. 
These simple steps provide law enforcement with a clear-cut rule 
regarding cloud network searches and seizures. Courts then must 
make known to law enforcement that the Fourth Amendment 
protects the cloud by refusing to grant overly broad warrants and by 
suppressing evidence that law enforcement obtains from the cloud 
when it is a result of an unreasonable search or seizure. 
Society already recognizes that the Fourth Amendment protects 
the cloud, and the law must respect this protection. For example, 
many people believe that their materials in the cloud are protected, 
and would be outraged if their cloud network service provider simply 
turned their documents over without informing them. 219 Even major 
companies are calling for an overhaul of online privacy law.220 
Therefore, the current legislation and departmental policies that have 
trended towards requiring additional warrants for cloud network 
searches, instead of unconstitutionally negating the requirement all 
together, must continue to evolve. Law enforcement agencies must 
adopt guidelines like those described in the Department of Justice's 
guide, Searching and Seizing Computers and Obtaining Electronic 
Evidence in Criminal Investigations,221 which urges local agencies to 
adopt an operational policy that requires agents to obtain a second 
warrant when the data they seek is stored elsewhere in the country.222 
Further, the legislation must recognize the Fourth Amendment's 
protections of the cloud by refusing to codify the procedure for 
searches of a cloud network account pursuant to anything less than a 
warrant based on probable cause. 
219. Horrigan, supra note 10 (reporting high levels of concern from cloud 
network users when asked about how they would feel if the cloud 
network provider took various actions with their data). 
220. See, e.g., DIGITAL DUE PROCESS, http://digitaldueprocess.org (last 
visited Oct. 30, 2012) (for information about the organization, its goals, 
and a list of its current members). 
221. Office of Legal Educ. & Exec. Office for United States Attorneys, 
Searching and Seizing Computers and Obtaining Electronic Evidence in 
Criminal Investigations, vii (2009), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/cybercrime/docs/ssmanual2009.pdf 
(noting that the guide is not binding, and is simply meant to be used as 
guidelines) . 
222. Id. at 90 ("If the agent comes across evidence of a crime that is not 
identified by the warrant, it may be safe practice to obtain a second 
warrant."). 
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holding box, and typically does not access or look at a user's data 
:Vithout permission, nor does the provider police what the user places ~n. the accoun~ by examining every file. 215 This is not the same type of 
Jomt ownership and control that occurs in consent cases where two 
people are living together and sharing the space. 2rn ' The cloud 
provider merely provides the space and that is all. Therefore, the 
second factor closely ties into the first. A cloud network user has not 
knowingly exposed his data to the public the way that somebody who 
is using a business computer network has. Unless the cloud network 
user chooses to knowingly share his files with other users the user is 
engaged in personal and private use of the cloud. In 'a computer 
network or consent search case, the user knowingly places his files 
where others can access them. This is not the case with the cloud. 
Thus, because a warrant exception does not negate the warrant 
requirement, the answer to the hypothetical remains the same. 
V. CONCLUSION: GET A WARRANT 
The Ninth Circuit in Comprehensive Drug Testing noted in dicta 
that "[':]here computers are not near each other, but are ~onnected 
electromcally, the original search might justify examining files in 
computers many miles away, on a theory that incriminating electronic 
data could have been shuttled and concealed there. The advent of 
fast, cheap networking has made it possible to store information at 
remote third~party locations[.]" 217 The Ninth Circuit then recognized tha~ r.equestmg th.at people not utilize current technology to store 
their files and media was "no answer," as it "is no longer a peculiarity 
or luxury of the very rich; it's a way of life. "21s 
The Fourth Amendment protects, and must continue to protect, 
the cloud network. In the hypothetical discussed at the beginning of 
this Note, the law enforcement agent's next step would be to obtain a 
second warrant to search the suspect's cloud account. Through his 
215. 
216. 
217. 
218. 
See, e.g., id. ("You are solely responsible for your conduct, the content 
of your files and folders, and your communications with others while 
using the Services."). 
But see Rodriguez, at 188-189 (1990) ("the surrounding circumstances 
[of the .search] could conceivably be such that a reasonable person would 
doubt its truth and not act upon it without further inquiry. As with 
other factual determinations bearing upon search and seizure 
determination of consent to enter must "be judged against an objectiv~ ~tandard: would the facts available to the officer at the moment ... 
warrant a man ~f reasonable caution in the belief' "that the consenting 
party had authority over the premises?"). 
United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 621 F.3d 1162, 1176 (9th Cir. 2010) (en bane). 
Id. at 1177. 
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search pursuant to the first warrant, the agent has established 
probable cause to support a warrant application. to s.earch the 
suspect's cloud account. Thus, after his warrant is reviewed and 
possibly granted, he may either show the warrant to the suspect and 
request, politely, that he be given access to the cloud account,. or he 
may bring the warrant to the cloud network provider and obtam the 
data or means to access the data, directly from them. 
These simple steps provide law enforcement with a clear-cut rule 
regarding cloud network searches and seizures. Courts then must 
make known to law enforcement that the Fourth Amendment 
protects the cloud by refusing to grant overly broad warrants and by 
suppressing evidence that law enforcement obt~ins from the cloud 
when it is a result of an unreasonable search or seizure. 
Society already recognizes that the Fourth Amendment protects 
the cloud and the law must respect this protection. For example, 
many pe~ple believe that their materials in the c~oud are. prot~cted, 
and would be outraged if their cloud network service provider s1m~ly 
turned their documents over without informing them. 219 Even maJor 
f Ii . l 220 companies are calling for an overhaul o on ne ~r~vacy aw. 
Therefore, the current legislation and departmental policies that have 
trended towards requiring additional warrants for clou.d network 
searches, instead of unconstitutionally negating the reqmre~ent all 
together, must continue to evolve. Law enforcement agencies i:iu~t 
adopt guidelines like those described in the Departn:er_it of Justice .s 
guide, Searching and Seizing Computers . and Obtaining Elec~ronzc 
Evidence in Criminal Jnvestigations, 221 which urges local .agencies to 
adopt an operational policy that requires agents to obtam a second 
warrant when the data they seek is stored elsewhere in the country.2~2 
Further, the legislation must recognize the .Fourth Amendments 
protections of the cloud by refusing to codify the procedure for 
searches of a cloud network account pursuant to anything less than a 
warrant based on probable cause. 
219. 
220. 
221. 
222. 
Horrigan, supra note 10 (reporting high levels of concern. from cloud 
network users when asked about how they would feel if the cloud 
network provider took various actions with their data). 
S DIGITAL DUE PROCESS, http://digitaldueprocess.org (last 
ee, e.g., h . t" "t 1 
visited Oct. 30, 2012) (for information about t e orgamza 10n, I s goa s, 
and a list of its current members). 
Office of Legal Educ. & Exec. Office for United Stat~s A~torney~, 
Searching and Seizing Computers and Obtaining Electronic. Evidence in 
Criminal Investigations, vii (2009), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/cybercri~e/~ocs/ssmanual2009.pdf 
(noting that the guide is not binding, and is simply meant to be used as 
guidelines) . 
Id. at 90 ("If the agent comes across evidence ?f a crime .that is not 
identified by the warrant, it may be safe practice to obtam a second 
warrant."). 
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Until law enforcement routinely recognizes the Fourth 
Amendment protects the cloud network, an additional added 
protection is to continue to allow magistrates to impose restrictions 
on comp~ter ':arrants.. Magistrates can do this by strictly enforcing 
the particulanty reqmrement and by placing strict parameters on 
comput~r warrants. If a magistrate grants a warrant for a computer 
hard drive, he should specifically note that the search cannot expand 
onto the cloud. Then, if the agent oversteps his bounds, the defense 
may use the warrant's imposed limitations to suppress any data seized 
unlawfully from the cloud. Restrictions such as limiting the search 
parameters to the physical hard drive, requiring searches to be 
conducted on copies of the hard drive instead of the actual computer 
or requiring that search of the computer takes place off-line223 will 
prevent law enforcement from even "accidently" exceeding the bounds 
of t~e. warrant. If magistrates clearly and consistently apply 
re~tnct10~s to computer search warrants and suppress unlawfully 
~eized evidence from the cloud, law enforcement will get the message: 
if they want to go beyond the physical hard drive, they must obtain a 
separate warrant. 
These additional steps will not interfere with law enforcement's 
ability to continue to perform effective searches and seizures. Users of 
the cloud network have not given up their expectation of privacy 
simply because they choose to use the best means of data storage 
available. When the user has not shared the documents through a 
network beyond one he has created for himself, he has not exposed 
the documents to the public and maintains his reasonable expectation 
of privac~. .The law must recognize this and must be willing to 
develop cntena for the expectation of privacy to meet the demands of 
the evolving technological world. 
223. In some cases, data saved in a cloud network account is not accessible 
from a device that is off-line. 
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SA YING THE SPOTIFY REVOLUTION: 
RECALIBRATING THE POWER 
IMBALANCE IN DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 
E. Jordan Teague1 
ABSTRACT 
Many believed that Spotify woul:1 revo.lutionize the music 
industry, offering a legal alternative to file shanng that compensates 
musicians for use of their digital music. Why, then, have artists b~en 
abandoning the Spotify revolution in droves? Becau~e the revolut10n 
has a dark side. Since Spotify is partly-owned by maJor .record la~el~, 
it has a serious conflict of interest with independent artists. Spot1fy s 
lack of transparency about its financial flows gi~es. musician~ fur~her 
reason to question whether the service has their mtere.sts m mm~, 
particularly in light of the microsc?~ic royalties Spotify ha~ paid 
artists to date. This climate of susp1c10n has caused many artrn.ts. to 
abandon the service and pursue alternative means of d1g1.tal 
distribution and promotion. Even listeners ha:e begun ~eavmg 
Spotify on account of how it treats artists. Iromca~ly, Sp~t1fy has 
managed to alienate the very audiences it need~ as allies: artists, who 
supply Spotify's "unlimited" song library;. ~nd listeners, who fund t?e 
service through subscriptions and advertismg. ~s such, the Spo~1fy 
revolution is destined to fail-an unfortunate reality, as the streammg 
music business model has great potential to benefit artists and serve 
the underlying goals of copyright. . . 
I argue that the most effective way to save the .sp?t1fy revolut10n 
is through a compulsory licensing scheme. This IS bec~use. t~e 
primary impediment to Spotify changing it~ treatr:ient of artists is its 
insulation from competitive pressures, which ultimately stems from 
the major labels' formidable bargaining position in digital . soui:d 
recordings. The labels have assumed a. ga~ekeeping function m 
streaming music, demanding corporate eqmty m. exchan?e for access 
to their sound recordings, which every streammg service. needs ~o 
build a comprehensive catalog. As a result, the streammg music 
market has very few participants, all of which are partially controlled 
1. Jordan Teague is an associate at Burr & Forman LLP in. Birmi~gha_m, 
Alabama. She received her J.D. in 2012 from Vanderbilt. Umvers1ty 
Law School, where she was the Senior Technology Editor of the 
Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment and Technology Law. Jordan 
· d h B A magna cum laude in Mathematics-Economics from receive er . . 
Furman University in 2005. 
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